Development Projects and the Economic Displacement of Urban Micro-Enterprises in Nairobi City, Kenya

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Abstract
The 21st century has been much associated with globalization and infrastructure booms. These factors have led to accelerated urban renewal projects, tailored to accommodate urban growth in many Countries. For Kenya, numerous urban renewal projects are in the pipeline, under the auspices of blueprints such as the Nairobi Urban Transport Master Plan (2014-2030). Recently, Kenya has also upgraded its land acquisition and displacement framework to manage development projects with enormous land acquisition, among other
reasons. The framework apportions different entitlements to both formal and informal PAPs
displaced by development projects. The question, however, is the effectiveness of the
framework, as concerns economic displacement of vulnerable informal micro-enterprises.
This paper is a culmination of research undertaken on the displaced informal
micro-enterprises during the expansion of outer ring road in Nairobi, Kenya. A sample of 210
of the 615 displaced micro-enterprises was selected using systematic random sampling. Both
quantitative and qualitative research techniques are utilized. Results indicate that even though
the project had adequate income and livelihood restoration components, they were
non-prioritized hence negative impacts and outcomes to the dislocated micro-enterprises. The
major recommendation is that Kenya should adopt resettlement with development where
resettlement is carried out as a separate development project lasting more than ten years. Also,
the micro-enterprise and DIDR frameworks can be strategically linked to deliver synergetic
outputs. The international finance Institutions such as World Bank can also assist in the
highlighted aspects, during this period when they are fortifying Country systems for DIDR
across the World.

Keywords: Development projects, Land acquisition, Displacement, Resettlement,
Micro-enterprises, Economic impacts, Social impacts

1. Introduction and Objectives
Increased urbanization, globalization, trade liberalization and connections stimulate the need
for improved infrastructure and greater investment projects. Synchronously, urban renewal
projects, mainly in transportation, sewage, and pipeline networks have since been scaled up
as a strategy to enhance and accommodate urban growth and development. DIDR
(Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement) is a prerequisite process of
development, but without adequate management, it can breed retrogression and confer
unequal distribution of benefits thereby reneging on sustainable outcomes envisioned by the
same development projects (Cernea, 2009; Singer, 2015).

The Government of Kenya has recently upgraded and put in place an elaborate legal, policy
and institutional framework for compulsory land acquisition, displacement and resettlement
after the enactment of the revamped Constitution of Kenya 2010, the Land Act (2012) and
Land Amendment Act (2016), the National Land Commission Act (2012) and the
Community Land Act of 2016 (GOK, 2010; GOK, 2012; GOK, 2016a; GOK, 2016b). The
framework stipulates legal guidelines for DIDR and entitlements to both formal and informal
PAPs (Project Affected Persons) in varying provisions. However, the question is how
effective the framework is, in cushioning the impacts and ensuring sustainable outcomes for
DIDR. This is mostly for the informal micro-enterprises (commonly known as ‘juakali’ in
Kenya), who are commonly located in the city peripherals, where there is a vast market for
their products. Because land prices in the city are beyond their reach, they usually encroach
on the public land reserves near densely populated residential areas. The legality of their
business operations in road reserves (known as “road economics”) is a bone of contention but
the National and County Government charges for business permits and collects daily cess
fees from them, thereby implicit recognition of their presence. The system and authorities
continue to tolerate them, as they generate critical employment, intermediate household
goods and technological innovations for the urban environments, hence inclusive
development in Kenya. As such, these micro-enterprises become dislocated to pave the way for public investments during periods when the public road reserves are utilized.

In 2015, Kenya was elevated from least developed Country to middle-income Country by a World Bank report (WorldBank, 2015a). A considerable contribution to this elevation is driven by the expanding micro-enterprise sector, which absorbs about 50% of new non-agriculture employment and 30% of total employment in Kenya (ILO, 2010). The significance of informal micro-enterprises to the economy of developing countries is very high, and studies have shown that cheap inputs from the informal micro-enterprise sector further leverage the growth of formal sector industries. The Kenyan Government recognizes that these micro-enterprises offer employment to a large number of people in the urban areas, thereby enhancing social order and security, among other benefits. Statistics indicate that by 2014, the Government, in conjunction with the banking sector had disbursed over $3.4Billion to the micro-enterprise sector as a policy direction for their conceived expansion (CBK, WorldBank et al., 2015).

The National and Nairobi City County Governments had earmarked outer-ring road for expansion in the Sessional Paper on National Integrated Transport Policy –NITP and the Nairobi Urban Transport Master Plan (2014-2030) (GOK, 2009, NCC & JICA, 2014). The 13km road had very acute and perennial traffic jams as it stretches towards the industrial area of Nairobi City, the busy Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, and the city’s Industrial Area. It also acts as a link between two major highways (Thika superhighway and the Eastern Bypass). The launching ceremony was held on January 22nd, 2015, graced by President Kenyatta of Kenya and senior representatives of AfDB (African Development Bank). The Government of Kenya and AfDB Contributed 15% and 85% towards the total project cost respectively. 615 informal micro-enterprises (445 stationary and 170 open-market traders), and a few commercial-cum-residential properties were dislocated by the project (AfDB, 2013; APEC, 2013a; APEC, 2013b). Available literature on urban displacement shows that the informal urban micro-enterprises (without legal entitlement) are very vulnerable to displacement because the acquisition of high-value urban-land magnifies the costs of their resettlement and livelihood restoration (Koenig 2009, Price 2009). DIDR specialists are now advocating for consideration in the activities of the UN (United Nations) because much like armed conflicts or natural disasters, DIDR subjects the affected persons to declining economic circumstances.

This particular study investigates the impact (Impacts are drawn from IRR model, which gives possible risks that impact on displaced PAPs) and outcomes (Outcomes are drawn from the sustainable development theories which delineates conditions for sustainable development and livelihoods) of economic displacement on the informal micro-enterprises, during the expansion of Outer-ring road in the outskirts of the capital city, Nairobi from two to six lanes dual-carriageway. The micro-enterprises displaced had been operating their small-scale businesses in designated road reserves for a considerable amount of time, varying from 5 to 15years. Many scholars of DIDR have focused their studies on the effects of DIDR on households, but very few have captured the effect on business enterprises, yet micro-enterprise income provides a crucial lifeline to the households.
2. A Global Glimpse Into the Outcomes of Urban DIDR

Urban PAPs, especially those without formal entitlement, are more prone to the displacement risks and negative impacts than rural PAPs. The impacts are compounded by state negligence, inefficiency, and indifference which accelerate their impoverishment. The range of human needs is constantly changing, and the micro-enterprises need to innovate to thrive. However, with lack of livelihood restoration and less strategic locations, the incomes and social networks dwindle off and disrupts the economic returns of the micro-enterprises hence ‘premature death.’ Resettlement components like livelihood restoration, rehabilitation, and benefit sharing are difficult to implement or simply abandoned after the displacing project is completed (Cerne, 2008; Choi, 2013; Koenig, 2014).

India has produced voluminous literature on urban displacement and its equal share of critique in Asia. The ambitious urban renewal projects in India have been under the auspices of the National Government’s flagship programme, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). Financing for the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), which had been funded by the World Bank, was suspended until the set requirements for resettlement were upheld. The provision of subsidized housing to PAPs was not complemented by sustainable livelihood installation or restoration thus their subsequent impoverishment after displacement. The marked appreciation of surrounding land after state expropriation breeds resentfulness among PAPs concerning the foregone appreciation/opportunity value (George & Rajan, 2015, Patel, Sliuzas et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in the quest for realization of sustainable displacement and resettlement outcomes, India and Indonesia have since upgraded their legislative frameworks for DIDR in 2013 and 2012 respectively (GOI, 2012; GOI, 2013).

During the years 1949-1978, DIDR in China was carried out haphazardly with little compensation amidst other compelling hardships for PAPs. Over the years, China has formally recognized DIDR as a long-term development opportunity lasting up to 20 years, otherwise known, as Resettlement with Development (RwD). RwD is replete with productive skills enhancement, benefit sharing and other mechanisms that have been anchored in Law. Resettlement with development was most successful in the massive South to North Water Transfer (SNWT) Project of China (Lindal, 2012). China appears to possess improved urban DIDR practices such as an urban apartment (that cannot be transferred), social security (endowment insurance), education resources (relevant technical training and inclusive university level), preferential employment in Government facilities and direct monthly cash-transfers. There is also Government-bank-enterprise linkage program implemented for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in cases where they have been displaced (Liu, 2007; Shi, Zhou et al., 2012). Voluntary Poverty alleviation programs have also been successively undertaken in China, much like slum upgrading projects in other parts of the World. However, researchers argue for a more comprehensive compensation and stakeholder consultations to lessen emergent social conflicts (Shi, 2009; Xu & Shi 2012; Wu 2017). Researchers also note that, for the Three Gorges Urban Resettlement areas, RwD was unevenly applied and had different outcomes in maintaining and raising the incomes of PAPs (Wilmsen, 2016).

Positive displacement and resettlement experiences have also been recorded in Pakistan. The Lahore Punjab Municipal Improvement Project (2006-2013) computerized the complaint
tracking management system. The project also adopted gendered empowerment, payment of adequate compensation (both to formal and informal PAPs) and prioritized livelihood restoration through a thorough, relevant skills enhancement programme thereby positive outcomes for the DIDR scheme (Zahra, et al., 2012; Roquet et al., 2015). In Bangladesh, displacement and resettlement processes have had divergent scenarios. Apparently, projects financed by IFIs have had solid socio-economic safeguards which translate to excellent outcomes for PAPs involved. The same is not replicated in Government-revenue financed projects. Zaman (2017) connotes the term ‘double standards’ to amplify the improved but insufficient Land Legislation of 2016 which has still not, addressed the inherent risks for the displaced and more specifically, the vulnerable in the context of Government-financed projects. For the rest of Asia, resettlement outcomes in many circumstances are for the most, appalling. In Colombo Sri-Lanka, an urban renewal project was accused of benefiting the wealthy elites, while pretentious of the underlying poverty issues in the city. The project worsened the living conditions of the poor PAPs, and the compounded lack of income installation rescinded the livelihoods of the poor (Collyer et al., 2017).

For Western Countries, DIDR is an insignificant issue affecting a small percentage of the community. Terminski (2013) notes that for Countries with vibrant socio-economic systems, change from one residence to another will never lead to extreme socio-economic consequences, unlike in African or Asia where DIDR affects entire socio-economic formations and affiliations of both rural and urban PAPs. However, in the USA, a 50-year plan for the City of Detroit has been released to the public and is already facing stiff opposition. Arguably the most ambitious design of a modern City, the Detroit Future City (DFC) plan comprises modernized infrastructure. The stiff opposition to the project demonstrates that even in the developed countries, DIDR is laden with accounts of mixed results (Safransky, 2014).

For Africa, there are different outcomes for PAPS involved in either, DFI (Development Finance Institutions) or Government-financed urban projects. In Ethiopia, Yntiso (2008) notes that relocation of people from the city urban areas to the outskirt resettlement sites to pave the way for an urban development project caused the majority of the micro-enterprises to lose business clients, locational advantage, disrupted rural networks and increased transport costs to the city. Similarly, in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, DIDR led to social networks disruptions and negatively affected employment prospects especially for women (Hooper & Ortolano, 2012). Nevertheless, public information dissemination, proper documentation for slum dwellers and collaboration with local NGOs in the Mauritania Urban Development Project, was a critical success factor in the implementation of prosperous resettlement and financed by World Bank. The resettlement scheme was replete with income restoration components and acquisition of permanent houses in resettled areas (http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case-examples/ce-MU-Nou.html). In Morocco, the AIN NOKBI Industrial Park constructed for small-scale enterprises after the Urban Development Project had a successful resettlement scheme. The strong supervision from state institutions and provision of contingency funds led to the success in implementation of the resettlement programme (Roquet et al., 2015). Africa is also, the first continent with a legally binding convention devoted to the protection and assistance of persons affected by conflict...
and DIDR. The Kampala Convention was adopted in October 2009 and was ratified by 15 African Union members on December 6th, 2012. In addition to its binding character, Article 10 of the document delineates the main principles regarding the implementation of development projects and involuntary resettlement (Ojeda, 2010, Juma, 2012).

In Kenya, the expansion of Thika highway to TEN-Lane superhighway (the largest road project in Kenya so far and completed in 2012) reduced the traffic gridlock with more than 80% and facilitated commerce in the entire country. However, the informal PAPs and micro-enterprises which were heavily lined up along the way were forcefully evicted without requisite compensation and livelihood restoration. But then, the DIDR scheme for the super-highway (2008-2009) was affected during a period when Kenya did not have the current enhanced DIDR framework. In another slum upgrading project in Nairobi city, Kenya, the poor PAPs could not afford the subsidized rent in splendid new housing, because the project did not tackle the underlying poverty and deprivations. Very little is recorded about the DIDR scheme for urban renewal projects in Kenya, but generally, they have been associated with inadequate livelihood installation or restoration, non-existent benefit transfers and poor management of PAPs expectations hence social conflicts, project oppositions, protracted litigations and operational risks (Metcalfe et al., 2011; KARA & CSUD, 2012; Munub et al., 2016; Munubi et al., 2016).

3. The Instruments and Evolution of DIDR in Kenya

In Kenya, DIDR cannot escape colonial history and heritage. Immediately after Africa was partitioned at the Berlin conference of 1898, European occupation of the ‘fresh colonies’ was accelerated. During this time, the aim was to appropriate material and commercial resources by facilitating corporate capital, as well as encouraging new settlements in the fresh colonies (https://softkenya.com/kenya/land-in-kenya/). Kenya became a colony under the British Protectorate after the enactment of East-African Land ordinance of 1901. The British Governor of the protectorate expropriated all land in East Africa including Kenya and placed it under the British crown and colonial authority (Mwaruvie, 2011).

Numerous land ordinances were ratified in 1902, 1908, 1915, 1919, 1920 and 1921 to attract and protect the British settlement and commercial interests in Kenya. These land ordinances continued to reaffirm that all indigenous Kenyan communities were tenants at the mercy of the British Crown. Consequently, there was widespread native resettlement from the resource-rich to other areas (known as ‘native reserves’ to pave the way for resource exploitation (Munubi et al., 2016). The local native’s fortunes steeply dwindled, and an uprising dubbed the ‘MAUMAU,’ started with the aim of repossessioning the ancestral land taken away forcibly by the British. The British granted Kenya independence in 1963. However, the various draconian land-ordinances were not revoked. They were rather entrenched in the first Constitution of Kenya of 1963, to continue safeguarding the existing British interests and settlements (Furedi 1989, Yamano and Deininger 2005). The Independent Kenyan Government had to buy back land from the settlers and resettle the displaced natives. By 2005, 453 resettlement schemes had been established in Kenya by the independent Kenyan Government. However, some of this good-intentioned resettlement schemes were hijacked by the political elites who amassed huge chunks of lands for private commercial interests.
Shortly after Independence, the Kenyan Government had also embarked on Development projects to harness the full economic potential of the country and spread modernization. Buoyed by the global commodity boom of the 70s and 80s, the Government focused on major investments in pillar sectors of road, rail, and energy to catalyze multiplier effects in the resource-rich sectors. The overriding instrument for compulsory land acquisition and resettlement in Kenya was Article 75 of the 1963-Constitution and Land Acquisition Act (cap 295) of 1968. However, DIDR was not given the control it deserved and most importantly, to remedy the tainted reputation of the resettlement schemes. Socio-economic dynamics and livelihood restorations for PAPs which underpin international standards were not factored. Thereon, the Government endeavors to undertake development projects were usually embroidered in various controversies (Yamano & Deininger, 2005; Boone, 2011).

The Kenyan Government had to result to the formation of various task-forces with the aim of enhancing the legal, policy and institutional framework for land and resettlement policy in Kenya such as the Ndungu Land Commission of 2003. These endeavors culminated in the crafting of the Sessional Paper No. 3 on National Land Policy (NLP of 2009). The policy identified the various concerns for Land and Resettlement management in Kenya and was entrenched in Chapter Five of the new Kenyan Constitution-2010 and the subsequent Land Act-2012, and the Community Land Act-2016 (GOK, 2009, Munubi et al., 2016, Kamakia et al., 2017). The Land Act (2012) and Land Amendment Act (2016) created the National Land Commission as the agency to spearhead and manage land acquisition and associated displacement (GOK, 2016a).

In our previous article (Kamakia et al., 2017), we have vividly interrogated and analyzed the Kenyan DIDR framework against the international best standards and practices derived from the DIDR policies of SIX Multilateral DFIs. In a nutshell, the article identified the inherent gaps as lack of solid instruments to sustainable livelihood restorations mechanisms and the inadequate tracking, supervision, and monitoring for DIDR in Kenya. There is also the mention but ambiguous commitment to benefit sharing or transfer mechanisms between the public interests driving the project and project PAPs. Moreover, DIDR framework has not taken the Resettlement with development (RwD) route, where it should be implemented as a separate development project lasting up to 10years. Hence, it is not also aligned with ‘development as a human right for all inclusive of PAPs’ as the minimum requirements.

4. Methodology

The study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative data techniques. Quantitative variables such as age and income (before and after DIDR) are recorded directly. For variables such as impacts (occasioned by the DIDR), expressed perceptions of project-level resettlement management (law, policy, and institutions), outcomes and coping strategies adopted by the micro-enterprises, the Likert scale is employed. The Likert-scale responses in each of these clusters are then reduced to single weighted average index. The result is quantitative data derived from structured questionnaire-based interview schedules for each micro-enterprise. These data are used to facilitate descriptive statistics and statistical inferences. To moderate quantitative data, qualitative data techniques are also used. For the focus group discussions and key informant interviews, SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) -PESTEL (Political, economic, Social, Technological, Ecological and Legal Factors)
A perspective was used. The study obtained the sampling frame from the RAP, and systematic random sampling was employed to select a sample of 210 micro-enterprises. These informal micro-enterprises were plying various trade activities such as dealers in second-hand clothes, poultry, boutiques, fruit & general kiosks, carpentry/furniture, timber & hardware yards, car wash, garage/mechanics and MPESA (Mobile-Money transfer agents) agents, etc.

5. Results

The scope of the RAP ensured that the legitimate PAPs with land, property and other assets were compensated at the gazetted rates, i.e., replacement costs at market value, loss of business, incidentals and any other applicable relief. The Informal PAPs were offered resettlement allowances consisting of relocation and transport allowances. Additionally, the RAP contained strategies for livelihood restoration and benefit-sharing for the informal PAPs. The main income/livelihood restoration strategy proposed was the construction of a market-stalls facility with a capacity of 1200 stalls for the displaced micro-enterprises. For the meanwhile, the micro-enterprises were temporarily relocated, to hosts markets of Kariobangi North, Kariobangi South, Tassia, Kiamaiko, Tena and Kangundo in the nearby locales, before the construction and completion of the facility. Because of business and social dynamics involved, many micro-enterprises displaced never took up this offer for reasons that are discussed exhaustively in the next section (discussions). The RAP had also envisioned credit disbursement and capacity building, mainly targeting employees of the displaced micro-enterprises. Pre-emptively, all this income and livelihood restoration strategies were delayed and non-prioritised, hence negative impacts to the micro-enterprises displaced (APEC, 2013b). The table below describes the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor (N=210)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in Years)</td>
<td>30- below</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51- above</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (on-job training, apprentice)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical/Diploma</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Years in</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Majority of the displaced micro-enterprises sought refuge in other road reserves in the surrounding locales but still less strategic. A few had rented formal business spaces premises in commercial buildings along the road but also less strategic and low business turnover as compared to former. Space availability in lucrative areas was an issue. This subsequent demand for business spaces had contributed to inflated rents, goodwill costs, and other transactional costs, thus adding another angle of ‘inflationary risk’ to the dislocated micro-enterprises.’ Focus Group Discussions also noted that there had been intense gentrification-speculation before and during the project hence, further rise in rents for the business premise. The study also established that business rivalry in the informal sector is cut-throat and complicated by invincible cartels. Because of such undercurrents, relocating to suggested host markets or other areas of the city would present difficulties, and therefore, the micro-enterprises’ concerned had to confine themselves to the less-strategic surrounding locales where business and social dynamics are familiar.

Table 2. Income and opinions about relocation package offered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In your own opinion, was the relocation allowance received satisfactory</td>
<td>Very Unsatisfied</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of relocation allowance received (in Kshs)</td>
<td>5000-10,000</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,000-30,000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate Monthly Net Income before resettlement (in Kshs)</td>
<td>5000-20000</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21000-40000</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41000-60000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 61000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Income is usually a strong indicator of socio-economic impact, in many DIDR studies. There was a marked decline in income for all micro-enterprises after resettlement. However, there was a high positive correlation between micro-enterprise income (before Resettlement) and income (after resettlement) with a high adjusted $R^2$ of 0.89317. This means that enterprises that were accruing high income before DIDR continued to draw high income after DIDR but at a much lower scale than previously netted. This is consistent with a study done in Vietnam which results showed that households with high incomes before resettlement had difficulty recovering the same income levels after resettlement (Bui, Schreinemachers et al. 2013).

Focus group participants established that high-income micro-enterprises (before resettlement) usually had assets, machines, technology and technical skills thereby pursuing plausible prospects at the new sites. Even when all micro-enterprise PAPs drew the applicable DIDR allowances, the main issue was adequacy as the micro-enterprise PAPs had expected to be relocated to a new market-stalls facility immediately after DIDR. An in-depth interview with Josiah Wandura, the Chief sociologist of KURA (Kenya Urban Roads Authority) established that the resettlement committee determined the formula for allocating the applicable allowances for the informal micro-enterprises after a lengthy interrogation period and approved by the advisory committee in whom AfDB (the financier) was a member. Accordingly, the nature and size of the business was a key factor in the determination formula.

Table 3. The socio-economic impacts of displacement on the micro-enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what level do you attribute the following to Displacement and relocation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decline in net income</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained loss of business clients &amp; opportunities</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Description</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of strategic locational advantage (proximity to road)</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced savings &amp; investment</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of capital assets</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of capital assets and equipment</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss/ decline of business partnerships</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss/ decline of suppliers</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss/decline of SACCO facilities</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffordability of food for self &amp; family</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffordability of health for self &amp; family</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffordability of education for self &amp; family</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss/decline of social networks and affiliations (ROSCAs)</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict &amp; hostility at new host locations</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower social status in new location</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss/Decline in political representation in new location</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Average</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Maximum = Strongly Agree = 2.00; Minimum= Strongly Disagree = -2.00)*


The matrix above was comprehensive enough as to capture the various impacts of DIDR on the Micro-enterprises. The cumulative mean impact index for the 210 micro-enterprises studied was 1.62 meaning that most micro-enterprises’ strongly agreed that the DIDR had impacted them negatively. Most micro-enterprises’ lamented that they had pressing credit and loan obligations, usually based on share-capital under the custody of their various ROSCAs. A similar scenario has been recorded by other researchers (Koenig, 2014; Bisht, 2009; Yntiso, 2008; Price, 2009; Munubi et al., 2016). Defaulting on loan payments translates to lower credit ratings, forfeiture of group’s share-capital, and auctioneering by debt collectors. This contributed to uncertainty and vulnerability as some of the micro enterprises had to sell selected business assets to fulfill such obligations. The study is in agreement with Alexandrescu (2013), where uncertainty and vulnerability (These are not considered in the original IRR model as well) emerge as an extra form of impoverishment risk. Political representation was not affected by the displacement (0.71) scored the lowest and PAPs agreed that local politicians lobbied various authorities on emergent issues such as the fast-tracking of the construction and expedition of the market-stall facility.
Table 4. Perceptions of the project-level DIDR management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inefficient resettlement management and organization by the resettlement committee</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non- genuine participation, consultation and information disclosure</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate supervision, monitoring, and evaluation of the DIDR scheme</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective grievance redress system</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Average</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Maximum = Strongly Agree = 2.00; Minimum = Strongly Disagree = -2.00)


According to the study respondents, resettlement management was not adequately provided. Apparently, stakeholder forums and consultations had been held. The issue, however, was the general lack of informational resources such as project brochures, website, and booklets, which aggravated the uncertainty and vulnerability. There was also poor supervision, monitoring and evaluation according to the respondents interviewed. There had been three project committees, i.e., Resettlement Committee, grievance redress committee and the advisory committee which were composed of members drawn from the key project stakeholders, i.e. PAPs, the County Government, National Land Commission, and the Kenya Urban Roads Authority. Inter-governmental coordination bottlenecks hampered the operations of the resettlement committee, and NLC (National Land Commission) did not take a front-position as mandated by law. According to the director of research at NLC, they were currently on a recruitment drive to acquire specialists to enhance the management of DIDR country-wide.

Table 5. Coping strategies adopted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coping strategy</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocated to another road reserve to continue my business activities</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented space in costly commercial buildings near vicinity of former locales</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting for the construction of the market-stalls facility while still searching for business space</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relocated temporarily but went back to former locales as a mobile vendor 17 8.1%

Resisted displacement and relocation hence facing the risk of eviction 18 8.6%

Relocated to other areas near the former locales but diversified to illegal or unsafe environmental business activities to survive 17 8.1%

Sale of business assets, equipment’s and other capital assets to settle outstanding loans while contemplating on the next move 10 4.7%

Withdrew children from former urban schools to less-expensive upcountry schools 4 1.9%

No response 4 1.9%

Source: Author 2017.

The study sought coping strategies adopted by the micro-enterprises as seen from the table above. Majority of the respondents (54.2%) chose to relocate to other road reserves to continue their business activities. A casual glance at all the coping strategies adopted, paints a picture of continued deprivation, uncertainty and vulnerability to impoverishment. The majority of the sample micro-enterprises called for the expedited construction of the market stall facility to revive their fortunes and livelihoods.

Table 6. Perceptions on the sustainability of outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions regarding the coping strategies adopted and their sustainability after the road expansion project</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of income and livelihood restoration strategies after DIDR.</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The outcome and coping strategies adopted are not socially sustainable</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The outcome and coping strategies adopted are not economically sustainable</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The outcome and coping strategies adopted are not environmentally sustainable</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall, the outcome and coping strategies adopted are not sustainable</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Averages</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Maximum = Strongly Agree = 2.00; Minimum = Strongly Disagree = -2.00)

When the study sought views on the unsustainability of the outcomes, a mean average index of 1.78 was recorded for the 210 respondents interviewed. This means that all respondents strongly agreed that the present coping strategies were socially, economically and environmentally unsustainable and consequently, there were undergoing untold hardships due to lack of income and livelihood restoration strategies. Focus group participants reckoned that the main issue was the lack of prioritization for the livelihood restoration and benefit sharing mechanisms.

6. Statistical Inferences

The study tested for the various statistical relationships, to enable generalizations from the sample data obtained. The study sought to test if there were any relationships between impact and income before Resettlement and Project-DIDR management. Normally, it was expected that micro-enterprises with high income (before resettlement) would have been less impacted and also, if project resettlement management had lessened the impacts at least, for some micro-enterprises, if not all of them. There was no correlation between (Impact and Income Before resettlement (IncomeBR) and the impact and micro-enterprise perception of resettlement management at the project-level with an adjusted $R^2$ of 0.008 and -0.00507 respectively. This means that all PAPs whether having high or low income before resettlement, reported having been heavily impacted by the displacement and also, all expressed poor perception of resettlement management and did not cushion the impacts for any micro-enterprise.

Table 7. Regression Equation (A)

| R$^2$     | 0.015 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.005 |
| Residual Variance | 0.164 |

While treating impact as the dependent variable, the regression equation also shows weak $R^2$ and adjusted $R^2$ meaning that for, micro-enterprises having the high incomes before resettlement did not necessarily translate to less impact after resettlement. Similarly, PAPs felt that the project’s DIDR management did not have a positive impact on any micro-enterprise.

There was also no correlational relationship between (outcome & impact) and (outcome & income after resettlement) with an adjusted $R^2$ of 0.0533 and 0.00384 respectively. This was because all the micro-enterprises interviewed reported poor outcomes and sustainability of the coping strategies as a result of the displacement. Even for the few PAPs who reported considerable high income (after resettlement), they also had the poor outlook of the sustainability of the outcomes and the coping strategies adopted. The study also tested if
post-resettlement management influenced the outcomes and coping strategies adopted. Similarly, results indicate that there was no correlation (adjusted R² of .02989) and all PAPs continued to feel vulnerable and uncertain about their future.

Table 8. Regression Equation (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>1.592 + 0.124 (Impact) + 0.001 (IncomeAR) + 0.074 (Res. Mngt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Variance</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While treating outcome as the dependent variable, the regression equation shows weak R² and adjusted R² meaning that there was no correlational relationship between the variables. This means that, even for the few PAPs who reported considerable high income (after resettlement), they also had the poor outlook of the sustainability of the outcomes and the coping strategies adopted. However, as earlier noted, there was a high correlation between micro-enterprise income (before resettlement) and income (after resettlement) with an adjusted R² of 0.89317.

7. Discussion

The IRR model (Cernea, 2005), and sustainable livelihood theories (Solesbury, 2003) are some of the mechanisms which analyze contexts through which poverty is directly linked to external shocks such as DIDR. In these circumstances, a vicious circle may set in as efforts to reproduce in the short-term leads to asset disposal in the medium and long-term, a process which deepens the impoverishment risks and impacts. Apparently, for this particular project, the elusive resettlement elements such as livelihood compensation and benefit sharing had been well factored, but the issue was timing and non–prioritization. The project had set to construct a market-stalls facility for resettlement of the micro-enterprises with a capacity of 1200 against the 610 displaced micro-enterprises. There was also the provision of relevant professional training, especially targeting employees of the former micro-enterprises. This training had been designed along plant operations and mechanics for the numerous Chinese engineering and Constructions firms in the entire of East Africa, which are apparently deficient in this specialized workforce. The training had planned to be undertaken in the prestigious Kenya Institute of Highway and Building Technology –KIHBT and the Railway Training Institute (RTI) of Kenya. Credit disbursement to PAPs–ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations) was also in the pipeline but had not taken good shape at the time of the completion of the research report. ROSCAS are key in socio-economic networking and mobilization of investment credit in the informal sector of Kenya. The ROSCAS rely on scrutiny and vetting by close-knit group members. These enterprises complement their business intelligence, credit facilities, and production systems from each other to sustain their income streams. Koenig (2014) observes that micro-enterprises such as mobile-street vendors
earn little and are very vulnerable to external shocks and often depend on social networks and ROSCAs to re-install or sustain their income streams. Before DIDR, many micro-enterprises had taken loans from the local SACCOs (Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations) to finance their operations.

The dislocated micro-enterprises encountered all the risks depicted in the Michael Cerneas IRR model (Cernea 2000). One of the criticisms of the IRR model is the failure to consider the behavior of the displaced PAPs as key actors in the entire DIDR processes. As such, vulnerability and uncertainty emerged as an extra form of impoverishment and was mainly caused by inter-institutional coordination hitches, lack of informational resources, a history of past displacement injustices and pressing loans & credit obligations. The study is in agreement with Alexandrescu (2013) where uncertainty and vulnerability are extra forms of impoverishment. For this study, inflationary risk also emerged as an additional form of impoverishment. This was due to the surging demand created by the displaced micro-enterprises searching for new business spaces and prospects in the same surrounding locales rise in rent, goodwill and other costs such as work-manship costs. The study also unearthed the case of intense land speculation and gentrification before and during the project implementation. Vanclay (2017) refers to it as ‘elite capture.’ As a result, this had contributed to a continued rise in rental costs as ‘big and better-capitalized enterprises’ jostled for business premises, thereby ‘edging off’ the micro-enterprises. It was apparent that, this remotely-linked category of persons and enterprises had been impacted positively by the project. Focus group participants resonated that for most displaced micro-enterprises, they held a deep connection with business spaces near vicinity of the former locales. Besides in the informal sector of Kenya, there is cut-throat competition, business rivalry and some other socio-economic dynamics that made it unrealistic to move to the suggested temporary host markets. Therefore, dislocated enterprises had preferred to move to other road reserves near the vicinity of former locales or rent business premises near former locales. Whichever the choice, the new business spaces were less strategic as compared to the former.

The study established that even when livelihood restoration and improvement components in the form of livelihood restoration, benefit sharing, skills training, and access to credit loans had been included, they were being implemented after the physical dislocation, much to the economic detriment of the micro-enterprises. At about the time of the study in Jan. 2017, the proposed site for the market facility was being utilized by the contractor as a storage facility for supplies. Cernea (2008) notes that, for many development projects around the World, social components and packages are shrouded in secrecy. Focus group participants also recounted that the grievance redress system was functional but severely limited and numerous complaints went unheeded. Women micro-enterprises had also realized extra hardship in coping with the ensuing displacement. Right from the outset, researchers have always posited that displacement associated risks affect women in deeper ways than they affect men. For instance, reconstruction of the micro-enterprises involved utilization of social networks and political linkages heavily dominated by males (Bisht 2009, Ambaye and Abeliene 2015). Miah and Kaida (2015) point out that income for most PAPs shrinks further after completion of the construction works, for those who benefit (procurement contracts) or get employment from the project. Focus group members further established that there had also been the
question of micro-enterprises’ in private business premises that were compulsorily acquired by the project. This had not been considered for compensation yet they had been in long-term lease contracts. Despite providing global leadership for safeguard standards, even the World Bank has also recognized some of the shortcomings associated with its present safeguards and aims to address them in the new pilot-ESF by the stringent management of livelihood components, through e-platforms for real-time social-performance tracking and an upgrade of the grievance redress service.

Overall, resettlement components had not been emphasized with the same zeal as the civil and engineering works. Sustainable development is that which assures that social, economic and environmental elements of development are balanced and complementary to each other. It is on this background that the UN Assembly has adopted 17goals, and 169 targets referred to as SDGs for 2030 (United Nations 2016). Research results indicate that the impacts such as the disruption of the social networks (i.e ROSCAs, Savings and Credit -SACCO facilities), and the negative coping strategies adopted had resulted in negative socio-economic outcomes which were already manifesting in the neighborhoods in the form of rising crime waves and burning of charcoal. If road projects are meant to hasten economic development as listed in Sessional Paper on National Integrated Transport Policy –NITP and the Nairobi Urban Transport Master Plan (2014-2030) of Kenya, then adequate DIDR must be strongly incorporated within the engineering works. The micro-enterprise PAPs were enduring untold hardships as a result of the livelihood restoration delays. Micro-enterprise PAPS interviewed forecasted that the construction of the market-stalls facility would reverse the damages if expedited. This, however, would come at a time when the impacts had caused a significant dent in the micro-enterprises assets and resource base.

8. Summary, Conclusion, and Way-forward

As a developing country, Kenya finds itself in a very compromising situation where micro-enterprises have invaded public road reserves especially near locales with dense populations. However, these micro-enterprises generate the much-needed employment and contribute immensely to the economic growth, development and innovation indicators for Kenya. This paper is a culmination of research on urban micro-enterprises dislocated during the expansion of outer-ring road in the city of Nairobi, Kenya. The micro-enterprises enjoyed a strategic location in the vicinity of densely populated residential estates, thereby accessing vast market for their products, hence heavily impacted by the displacement. Findings indicate that even though livelihood restoration and benefit sharing mechanisms had been factored, they were insufficiently managed and non-prioritized, thus micro-enterprises dislocated experienced negative impacts. The negative impacts had also contributed to the coping strategies adopted and unsustainable outcomes at the time. Development projects that do not confer social-economic responsibilities of PAPs, present a threat to inclusive economic progression and by extension, environmental and sustainable development. Nevertheless, the expedition of the livelihood restoration components has potential to reconstruct the economic wellbeing of the micro-enterprises’. These study findings have several implications, especially for many developing Countries, which are prepping for rapid economic growth. Kenya has upgraded its DIDR policy to match international standards in most aspects. However, this does not necessarily translate to its adequate management and flexibility at
unique site levels. Going forward, and recognizing the immense contribution of the micro-enterprise sector in Kenya and beyond, adequate resettlement management and livelihood restoration should be a priority for urban renewal projects in Kenya and a foundation of any DIDR scheme. Further, resettlement management should take the direction of RwD where DID is undertaken as a separate project with a lifespan of about ten years. DIDR must take the direction of benefit sharing/transfer and not only financial benefits but non-financial benefits as well, e.g., share and equity considerations, taxation redistribution systems, community development foundations and special RwD funds from the National budgets (Cernea, 2008; Shi et al., 2012; Sathe, 2017). A DIDR office should have been permanently located at the site to facilitate continuous resettlement management. Also, adequate tracking, monitoring, and evaluation in a real-time web-platform should always complement sustainability of DIDR programs in delicate urban environments. SIA (Social Impacts Assessment) and associated guidelines should be separated from EIA (Environmental Impacts Assessment) in line with international best practices in Kenya. This will ensure social impacts such as DIDR will be given the attention that EIA commands in Kenya. Social innovations can also be explored that assess the viability of resettlement as a climate adaptation and mitigation strategy and thereby access the vast global funds dedicated to addressing the climate change agenda (Tadgell et al., 2017). Smyth and Vanclay propose a Social Framework Model (SFM) that accommodates various schools of thought in both DIDR and development theory (Smyth & Vanclay, 2017).

Last but not least, there is an existing micro-enterprise policy in Kenya, heavily supported by Government policy banks. The policy utilizes the Government-bank-enterprise linkage to boost their growth through credit disbursement and training on book-keeping, erection of economic zones, technology transfer, etc. Similarly, Urban DIDR has components regarding credit, training and livelihood restoration for displaced micro-enterprises. The latter is loosely managed because it is spontaneous and prompted by development projects whereas the former is well grounded because it is continuous. The consensus components can be formally inter-connected to enhance sustainable outcomes in the delicate urban areas of Kenya, where many micro-enterprises currently face dislocation as a result of urban renewal projects. This study greatly contributes to the understanding of gaps in the resettlement framework for urban renewal projects in Kenya. Most of all, it connects the crucial links between DIDR and Micro-enterprise policies in Developing Countries.

Sustainable development is the way to go. Globally, Private corporations are also embracing sustainable development practices such as CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) as business operations without social considerations have become futile (GRI, 2016). The study commends the NLC of Kenya for spearheading accelerated resettlement schemes (mostly addressing historical-land injustices), currently under implementation phases. The Director of Research at NLC noted that this was expected to ensure the inclusive and sustainable development of the Country. The World Bank and AfDB are currently piloting and enhancing displacement-resettlement frameworks, with the aim of enhancing Country frameworks for projects financed by them. They can start by supporting Kenya on the highlighted aspects especially at this time of Private Public Partnerships (PPP) with enormous land acquisition.
Likewise, between 2011 and 2016, various Multilateral DFIs and authorities, have signed on various cooperative partnerships for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (Gu et al., 2017). For instance, In April 2016, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and World Bank signed a co-financing agreement that enhances management of SIA-DIDR components for project-finance in Developing Countries. These ensuing synergetic policy integrations should be deepened by such aspects highlighted in this paper.

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