Politics of Compliance in Global Infectious Disease Control: Cases of SARS Control in China

Victor Chi-Ming Chan

Abstract


This paper examines China’s compliance decisions of global infectious disease control in the cases of Severe Respiratory Acute Syndrome (SARS). The processes involve interactions of actors in various levels such as states, sub-state actors, and international actors. Although all states share the interests of a disease-free world, the consequences of national compliance on disease control processes are always costly and political. Why does a state comply with international standards mainly issued by World Health Organization (WHO) on infectious disease control? The paper looks into the politics of global infectious disease control by investigating the processes of China’s compliance decisions regarding SARS. More importantly, the paper addresses the political implications of compliance politics for China’s on global health crises.


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v4i1.5452

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