Notes on the Unity of Logic and Materialism

Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic, A reexamination
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Abstract
In the course of the first section, I make an attempt to define the most important actual implications of the theme that the anthology in question sets out to explore. In the next, I give a sketch of the three different modes of movement of logical thought present in Hegel’s Science of Logic, of their interrelation, and make a general criticism of the way that theme is handled in the book. In the third section, I stress the importance of an adequate understanding of the structure of the categories with which Hegel’s logical investigation takes its beginning. In the course of the two following sections, the interrelation between the themes of Hegel’s subjective logic and Marx’s commodity analysis are put into focus. The concluding section limits itself to giving an overview of the quality of the book in question, adding some words on the political significance of such literature in a broad context.

Keywords: Marxism, German idealism, Hegel, Methodology, Logic, Economics

1. Introduction
All according to circumstances, textual contributions which aim to elucidate theories of economics, or to explore their basic features, may take different forms. In a case like this, it has seemed right to use a book review essay to comment on the most important features of the relation between the logic of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) and the methodological framework of Karl Marx’s Capital.
The main reason for this will appear in course of the article itself, and lies – briefly put – in the fact that (at least in the Anglo-Saxon textual universe) there exists a severe gap between the scholarly quality of reflections on the theme coming to the fore in publications in book-form as well as in journals, and (on the other hand) of the actual systematic evaluation of them – be it after or prior to publication.

This can of course easily be taken as a criticism with a self-indulgent bias. One should do one’s best to keep such sentiments out in the cold. And anyway, it is clear that no one can apriori contend that an asymmetric relation as regards actual publication policy is impossible or improbable (Note 1).

So anyone should make a try to follow some investigations on the theme. Let a critical text count for itself.

2. Introducing the Main Subject

In 1857-58, Karl Marx worked on a draft where an early plan for the construction of his main work appeared. The manuscript, later published as Grundrisse, shows that he studied his object, capital and its concept, in its relation to the social forces appearing as “wage labor” and “landed property”.

To some extent, the contributors to the anthology here under review analyze the Marxian concept of capital starting out not from Capital, but from the Grundrisse. The reason is that in these drafts Marx made extensive use of Hegelian categories, mainly as they had appeared in the introduction to the third part of his Wissenschaft der Logik (WdL), i.e. Science of Logic (SL), entitled “Subjective Logic, or the Doctrine of the Concept”. In WdL (1812-1816), Hegel, as he indicates in the preface, aims at revolutionizing the discipline of logic by exposing the way in which thought, in the progress of exposing the structure of pure “thinking” or “intuition”, itself modifies and produces its object.

In a note to his analysis of the commodity and its “value-form” in the first edition of Capital (1867), Marx duly noticed Hegel’s greatness in this respect:

It is scarcely a wonder that the economists, fully under the influx of material interests, have overlooked the form-content (Formgehalt) of the relative value-expression, when prior to Hegel the professional logicians even overlooked the form-content (Forminhalt) of the paradigms of judgment and syllogism (Marx, 1966, 274).

This reminder is adequate for our present purpose, since Hegel’s subjective logic at an early point introduces judgment forms, followed by pure syllogistic forms – structures which reappear in the Marxian analysis of commodity and capital circulation and circuits, while they are reproduced in materialized and more concrete forms of productive activity in the remaining parts of the Logic of Hegel. (Namely, categories such as “mechanism”, “chemism” and “teleology” – terms conspicuously reminding one of historical realities of the technical foundation of the exploitation of labor, investigated in their interaction in the first volume of Capital).

However, Hegel begins his subjective logic by, prior to the judgments, inserting a treatise, entitled “The Concept”, which consists of three parts, “A. The Universal Concept; B. The Particular Concept; C. The Individual [Das Einzelne]” (cf. Hegel, 1970b 273-301). From this text-block, the judgment (and the following content, mediated through it), is deduced as a
consequence of an “ursprüngliche Teilung”, an “original partition”, i.e. a “diremption”, of the Individual – the German word for judgment being ‘Urteil’ (Note 2). As we shall try to indicate later on, Marx’s exposition in *Capital* depends on, to the contrary, presenting judgmental forms as versions of commodity exchange between persons (being “guardians of commodities”) and developing the object from their interaction – without any general reflection on method, something which for him would be little else than abstract logic.

A further aspect of Marx’s method of study in *Grundrisse*, is his structuring of capital itself according to the division in the determinations of the concept conspicuous in Hegel. His main theme he entitles “Das Kapital im Allgemeinen” or eventually “allgemeiner Begriff des Kapitals”, i.e. “general concept of capital” (Marx 1953, 175). It turns out that such expressions should not always be taken to be classificatory in a straightforward sense, but rather are terms covering an inner dynamics in the object itself – much in a way parallel to Hegel’s revolutionizing logic. Capital in “universality” or in “general” is then thought of as particularizing itself, like a conceptualizing thought-subject, depicted in Hegel’s “subjective logic” and the structural relation between capital and profit is (even in abstraction from factual capitalists) called ”individuality”, etc. Furthermore, Marx here goes on to treat capital, as related to a “perfected bourgeois system” (1953, 189), as an *organism* – a term doubtless indebted to Hegel’s dialectical categories of Desire and Life from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhS*) (1807), from whence Hegel’s general affinity to concepts of organism emerge. These categories mark the emergence of human labor in Hegel’s system, and from labor conceptual reasoning and spirit are developed. Marx shaped the capital relation as a concept of *universality*, positing its *Allgemeinheit* as having a relation to *Arbeit* – “mediating itself through alien labor” (1953, 186), which means that it integrates human conceptual expression within its own nature.

Consequently, it should be inserted here that it is quite in order when Mark Meaney, in one of the best chapters of the anthology, treating on “interest-bearing capital” (41-63), contends that ... the absolute necessity of the ordering of logical categories in an *a priori* synthesis of a Begriff of an organic whole is the reason why Hegel maintains he has developed the scientifically correct method in *SL*. Marx agrees with this claim. It is, as it were, the ‘rational kernel’ of Hegel’s exposition of method (50).

As for Marx, he adds that *competition* belongs to the said “inner nature”, for ... Capital exists and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as their interaction upon each other (1953, 317).

This unity of any entity with “Many”, immediately presents the said entity as “One”, which at bottom gives us the Hegelian theory of entities which exist as completely self-related, and consequently undifferentiated, “being-for-selves”. No wonder that this level will lead us *immanently* over to the factual existence of the capitalist, on his home ground, on the *money market*. The reason can be seen through one last illustrative point to be brought in by us in this first section, namely, Marx’s thesis that the integration of labor and thereby of subjective power into capital has the form of an “original partition”, which he expresses through classical terms from German idealism:
The only diremption which is posited through the process of production itself, is the original diremption (ursprüngliche Diremption), the one posited through the difference between objectified (gegenständlicher) and living (lebendiger) labor itself, [i.e.] the one between raw material and instrument of labor (1953, 207).

In other words, what is expressed in the labor process on part of the individual worker under capitalist conditions, is a diremption of the material world into instrument and material, resulting in a diremption of the conceptual activity of that worker, and a reuniting of the elements in the course of the labor process. If we look at these determinations in the form they acquire in capitalist production, they take the form of parts (fixed, respectively circulating capital) whose proportionate dimensions differentiate the “many capitals” from each other as relations even between constant and variable capital. These, in their turn, point to the importance of the accumulation of capitals and consequently the latter’s natural place inside the concept of das Kapital im Allgemeinen, “Capital in general”.

These constellations can be properly understood only if we have a closer look at the principle of movement of the spheres inside Hegel’s logical edifice. I will now turn to that system, since even here we find ourselves in a field unsatisfactorily delineated in the anthology.

3. The Three Main Movements of the Object of Logic

There are three main spheres in the SL: The doctrines of “Being”, “Essence”, and “Concept”. In the sphere of Being, thought moves from the simplest quality to the more complicated, such as from Being as such to There-being (Dasein), Something (Etwas), then to Being-for-self (Fürsichsein), One-and-Many, repulsion and attraction, leading over to thinking quantities, which turns over to thinking “measure”, i.e. quantities as relevant magnitudes in relation to specific qualities. In this sphere, the progress of thought moves unreflected from entity to entity as they present themselves unmediated, and Hegel calls this movement simply a transition, an Übergehen, a “passing-over” from one determination to the other.

In the sphere of Essence (or “Reflection”), thought no longer is immediate, but stands under a necessity to relate any entity to another. This necessity is a revelation of the inner connexion between entities; the Übergehen is now a “reflexivity”, a Scheinen. The presence of the Concept, on the other hand, which we have already met under the heading “Subjectivity”, makes the Individual understand itself, or the thought it activates, as the rational unity and inner connexion of all foregoing forms, and the form of movement is here a partition, a Teilung:

This transition or reflexivity is now transformed (übergegangen) in the original partition of the concept, which, in leading the Individual back to the being-in-itself of its universality, just as much determines the universal as actual (Wirkliches) (Hegel 1970b, 307) (Note 3).

The principle of movement is common to all three forms: It is Hegel’s “negation of the negation”. To describe it, it is convenient to point to its original epistemological version as it appears as a rational development of desire in PhS: Man physically modifies the quality of nature in a work-process, and by thought this modification is posited as a ‘negation’ of that quality. In this process, thought determines this latter activity as a negation of the posited negation, which means affirming a new quality.
In general, and given the provenance of SL from PhS, this version of the double negation is crucial for any understanding of Hegel’s logic. Accordingly, from the very start of that work, “quality” is in the center of analysis. The category of Being, as its first category, is not an abstract universality sans phrase, as many believe, but the Being of quality, a point which is of the utmost importance to Hegel, since his SL aims at overcoming the logic implied in Kant’s critique of reason, which commences with quantitative syntheses. Hegel, in using the expression “Being as such”, seeks to convince the reader that what is at stake as a starting point, is Being as quality.

A clarification is needed here. Hegel opens the doctrine of Being with a passage called “Bestimmtheit (Qualität)”. It is placed prior to the first chapter, wherein the three factors “Being”, “Nothing” and “Becoming” are introduced.

In the opening passage on “quality”, we read the following:

Being is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from the determinateness against the essence and also against any one which it can achieve inside itself. This Being, devoid of reflection (reflexionslose Sein) is Being as it is immediately in itself. Because it is indeterminate, it is Being devoid of quality (qualitätsloses Sein); but implicitly (an sich) it achieves the character of indeterminateness only in opposition (im Gegensatze) against the determinate or the qualitative. However, the determinate being (das bestimmte Sein) is what confronts Being in general (Sein überhaupt); thus its indeterminateness in itself makes up its quality (Hegel 1970b, 82).

The contention is, then, that Being, in being named “indeterminate”, is laid open to the determinate. The latter, i.e. quality, is therefore actually said to be present through abstraction. If, for a moment, we think of the other modi appearing in the sphere of Being, namely, quantity and measure, Hegel consequently has presupposed that these are not an option for the distinguishing of pure Being, taken in itself. Since pure Being, albeit it can be said to be open to determination, cannot (qua pure) have such determinations in itself (as we saw), so consequently, it is “pure indeterminateness and emptiness”. On the other hand, this emptiness must be of a kind that warrants the possible determination of being as quality and nothing else than quality. Hegel says: “There is nothing to be intuited (anzuschauen) in it”; and one can consequently conclude that if it can at all be talked about intuition here, then “it is only this pure, empty intuiting (Anschauen) itself” (ibid.). That is, we have to take intuition not as a content, but as form-giving activity (Note 4).

Marxists will, to the extent that they are apt to overlook this development of the basics of the Hegelian logic, eventually have difficulties in seeing the important connection between the latter and the following brilliant apercu on the shortcomings of materialism in the fifth of Marx’s theses on Feuerbach:

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants sensuous contemplation [die Anschauung]; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity (Marx 1969, 6) (Note 5).

Still, it is a recurring problem in the anthology under review that the connection is not grasped. Especially problematic in this regard is the chapter by Gastón Caligaris and Guido Starosta on Marx’s view regarding “the rational kernel” in Hegel’s dialectics (89-111). These
authors surprisingly contend that “few scholars have actually taken Hegel to task for beginning his systematic dialectics with a thought-form” (Note 6). However, to the extent that we are talking about a “pure being”, Hegel calls it not only as “pure thinking”, but also “pure intuition” – which seems clearly to denote its character as form for materiality.

Now, “pure Being” is nothing but double negation: it represents the self-likeness that is to be found in any abstraction, the aspect of the identity of the negation with itself. As such, it will become clear that the Absolute Idea which rounds off the Logic, is an actualized form of its point of departure.

It would seem outlandish to this reviewer having to take Caligaris and Starosta to be outright positivists. Yet that is not an unrealistic conclusion as long as they do not explain their position adequately. They advertise for a “proof ... that the structure of real material being actually coincides with the structure of pure thought-forms presented in the Logic” (95), and they consider it self-evident that “pure nothing”, to which, Hegel says, “pure Being” has always already passed over (übergangen), cannot meaningfully be said to exist. The coinciding of “the simplest form in which a real concrete exists”, they contend, can be discerned “only after submitting an existent object to materialist [sic] analysis” (Note 7).

Unfortunately, the point is that there does not, in Marx just as little as in Hegel, exist a “real” world to be conceptualized independently of physio-cognitive negations. For these latter are material, they are features of the world, necessary elements of its existence. Both thinkers might well accept that pure Being as well as pure Nothing does exist in this reality, just as evidently as do actual human material modifications (Note 8).

The existence and relevance of Hegel’s category of “qualitative Being” is not acknowledged until the authors reach the category of Being-for-self, quoting Hegel, who says that here, “qualitative being finds it consummation” (Note 9). This category, the Fürsichsein, is for Hegel being as “absolutely determined”, since it implies thinking all foregoing entities based on negation of pure Being (rather: of pure quality), as e.g. the Etwas (“Something”). Caligaris and Starosta want to make out of it the true first category of a “materialist” Logic.

Being-for-self is a level of the double negation which presents both thinking and its content as self-sufficient yet isolated. It is a necessary forerunner for figures on the verge of Quantity, e.g. “One” and “Many [Ones]”. The authors now call the content of its genesis “just formal stages” (106), and thus they are in fact introducing a world-image where entities will not be countable, i.e., no Something or Other (etc.) will ever take the form of a One or of Number. But happily, no logical negation is truly “formal” in the Hegelian system. And happily also, in this anthology there is to be found an article on competition, the “One” and the “Many”, which in a perfected and insightful manner synthesizes the categories of Marx and Hegel in this regard: Mario L. Robles-Báez on “Dialectics of Labor and Value Form” (292-317).

The gravity of Caligaris and Starosta’s situation can be seen in the fact that the doubleness of the negation has illusion-building characteristics which are developed not only in the second part of the SL (in the doctrine of Essence and Schein proper), but already in the Etwas, and specifically in the section on “One and Many” in the sphere of Being. To use wordage from the Logic of Essence, any positing (setzende) negation will here turn into a pre-supposing (voraussetzende) negation, since in its doubleness, negation manifests not only an identity
with itself, but also a differentiation from itself (qua negation), and furthermore a negating of its own activity, producing the illusion that the results of its activity stems from other sources. This Scheinen is a structure making up the essence of all dialectics, insofar as the latter is a method of liberation from self-alienating action. If these forms are put in brackets, as Caligaris and Starosta actually seem to do, the very core of the relation between universality, particularity and individuality (singularity) also disappears. For as we have pointed out, the dialectics of a Kapital im Allgemeinen can have its source only in the double-negating activity of the working masses inside factory gates.

A weakness in this anthology is that there is a virtual agreement among the authors that the dialectics, expressed in Grundrisse and Capital, should rely on one specific of the three forms of movement which Hegel presents. (Their opting for Scheinen is conspicuous.) But this approach has a somewhat naive basis, for the negativity in question is the same in all fields, and there will be no special difficulty in combining the forms, when needed. Furthermore, an exposition e.g. of the Marxian dialectics cannot present itself as building on, say, Hegel’s Scheinen, without it being shown what it would be like to build it on “transition” or on “original partition”, for these forms have to be conjoinable with any of the other two, if the Hegelian totality is in fact in place.

4. Socio-economic Content and Publication Periods of Marx’s Work

To discuss these matters more in detail, it is necessary to bear in mind how Marx in 1858 openly declared an indebtedness to Hegel: “As to the method of adapting, I’ve been greatly helped … by having once more leafed through Hegel’s “Logic”. (Marx 1970, 326) Furthermore, he seems to imply that this has led to his scrapping of the “doctrine of profit” in a former guise. Such an interpretation is placed at the center of many an argument in this anthology. It turns out to have a correspondingly great importance for the methodic approach flavouring the book as a whole.

Introductorily, some remarks on the corresponding subject: What is meant when the contributors make the contents of Marx’s Capital their object? This question also implicitly relates to their positioning of Hegel’s writings in the history of European thought. For instance: Is his Phenomenology of Spirit (the indispensable introduction to the Logic) a description of bourgeois society taken as something like a capitalist social formation? Is his Science of Logic a general image of the anatomy of the capitalist mode of production? If we are to analyze the relation between Logik and Kapital, we should not overlook the question of how Hegel does regard the bourgeoisie in the PhS, for it is the bourgeois estate, Stand, which through the dialectics of Enlightenment (Aufklärung) and Terror (Schrecken) manages to integrate all estates (Stände), i.e., the masses (Massen) (cf. PhS, Chapter VI B). into its own universal world view. Accordingly, a fundamentally Marxian evaluation of SL would imply that “Thought” as it appears there is an image of the bourgeois form of social dominance. But it will make a big difference if that dominance is regarded as adequately described (seen from a Hegelian observation point), or if Hegel from his own premises rather has misconstrued the relation between the “Estates” inside the “Masses”. In the latter case, it becomes imperative to investigate the relation between the thought-form of the bourgeoisie proper, in its difference to the forms of the dominated estates.
Differences such as these correspond in many ways to the difference in Marx between the dominant capitalist mode of production, and the wider concept of the capitalist social formation, where, as the very minimum, a landowning class is also present, acting in a socio-political ménage à trois with capitalists and wage workers. In fact, Capital I-III can be seen as an analysis of the mode as well as of the formation: If we call it an analysis of the structure of the mode of production (wage labor, methods of producing forms of surplus value, etc.), then it is an investigation of the relation of the core economic activity seen in relation to the activity of the historic dominant forerunner, landed property.

Seen strictly structurally, this deviates from Hegel’s scheme, where the logical movement of Spirit (portrayed in SL), reaches its only true externality while it is still an unhampered thinking, which then “freely releases” itself to nature, which is its Other, i.e. is the Otherness or externality of Spirit itself (cf Hegel 1970b, esp. 572). In Marx’s work, this is paralleled in the fact that landed property necessarily represents an alien force in respect to capital; in Grundrisse, Marx stresses that the accumulation drive leads “capital” to expand in such a way that it “has to posit a value or form of wealth specifically distinct from capital. This is ground rent” (Marx 1953, 187). On the other hand, there is a clear divergence between the two (Logic and Capital respectively), since what is contended in Capital’s treatment of landed property (the factor which, up to the existence of wage-labor based capital, has stood for the nature-based systems of exploitation), is that now that property is integrated in a new guise into the social economic form. In Grundrisse, Marx uses Hegel’s category of Ground (developed from Leibniz’ “Satz des zureichenden Grundes”, “the principle of sufficient reason”), to delineate the relation between the three basic ”factors”, saying i.a. that “capital, when it creates landed property, ... goes back to the production of wage labour as its general creative basis” (“als seines allgemeinen schöpferischen Grundes”) (cf. 1953, 186). This point, namely that modern landed property is a product of capitalist production, though without loosing its position as an autonomous ground, is recalled terminologically in Marx’s chapter in Capital III on absolute rent, insofar as this kind of ground rent may figuratively raise a wall (cf. Wygodski 1970, 102) around landed property, preventing further capitalist investment. It will – under the general condition of a below-average composition of capital in agriculture – prevent cultivation of a given piece of land if the product of that soil is not able to render a surplus over the price of production of the general agricultural produce; this very fact may lead the capitalist farmer (Pächter) to rise the price of the product, creating a rent that goes to the landowner. That is absolute rent: “... then landed property is the creative basis (der schöpferische Grund) of this rise in prices. Landed property has itself produced rent. (Das Grundeigentum selbst hat Rente erzeugt.) (Marx, 1968a, 563) (Note 10 & Note 11).

Thus, as is shown by the structure of Marx’s theory of the primitive accumulation from Tudor times on, as well as from his analysis of Wakefield’s bourgeois scheme for creating modern landownership, plus his doctrine of ground rent and its relation to capitalist prices of production, Capital I-III gives an economic description not just of capitalists and wage-workers in the mode of production, but also of landowners of various kinds. In fact, connected to his plan drafts in Grundrisse, Marx sets up an outline for the eco-political interaction of the three main classes in the capitalist social formation. (None of the contributors to the book under review seem to notice it).
Nonetheless, in the chapter by Juan Inigo Carrera on dialectics and working class consciousness (64-88), one finds the following essential conclusion as regards the body politick:

... after following the movement of capital, we discover that the antagonistic relations between personifications necessarily have a public character, namely a political character, in so far as the universe of the sellers of labor-power confronts the universe of its purchasers. In this confrontation, the former determine themselves as the working class and the latter as the capitalist class. That is, the indirect organisation of social labor through the valorisation of capital has class-struggle as its necessary concrete form. In turn, the concrete forms of class-struggle confront us with the determination of the state as the political representative of the individual capitals of society (81).

These deductions are certainly beyond “capital im Allgemeinen”. Capital differs from premodern forms of exploitation by the potency to function without violent attributes, and the so called economic mechanisms are to this extent allowed to operate peacefully in return for the fetishism subjugating the masses. Furthermore, the state cannot reach adequate legitimacy by belonging organically to a specific exploiting class, but must be understood to serve ruling interests through representing human beings qua commodity-owners (i.e. members of all three classes), i.e. through general role-functions detrimental to human freedom.

Results like the ones quoted above are presented by Carrera through a form of logical deduction. By all means, he tells the reader quite the opposite; he assures us that what he does is to “follow” the “movement” of commodities and capital, whereupon the “analysis discovers” the phenomena presented by Marx in the course of the maturing of his presentation of the capitalist mode of production. This Carrera calls “Dialectical Reproduction of the Concrete” (73-81). However, he presents nothing whatsoever to warrant the concrete or empirical tenability of this “analysis”. He is just summarizing what every reader could anticipate – partly correctly, partly just fancifully.

Carrera, like every other contributor, is modest in matters political. So let us pass on: What is his background for adapting the “method” described? It seems to be the following: He allegedly reports (84) from Marx’s remarks on ‘dialectic’ in one of his comments to Capital I, to the effect that “in its mystified form, dialectic ... seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things”. From this point of departure alone, he wants to demonstrate “the need to develop a dialectic the inverse of Hegel’s”. But this is a misuse of the text, since Marx is here only accessorially referring to what he calls “the mystifying side” (ibid.) of Hegel’s dialectic, and in the main to the so-called dialectic developed in Germany after Hegel (Note 12). Also, even without such a misconception, the context would not be fitted to show any necessity of breaking with Hegelian dialectics (cf. 84-85).

According to Carrera,

Hegel idealistically inverts the fact that knowledge is always knowledge of one’s subjectivity with respect to the object upon which one is going to act, ... [and] inverts the question into that of the re-establishment of the identity between the subjective process of knowing and the objective determination of the potentiality [of the object] .... [Hegel takes] immediate knowledge as pertaining to a subjectivity which confronts itself from its own exteriority,
since it is not capable of recognising the object as its own self-realisation (67).

Carrera’s attempt to justify this view is not underpinned with any clear textual reference. If one takes the most adequate of Hegel’s texts on the matter, namely, the first chapters of *PhS*, Carrera’s views seem untenable. What happens there, is that the isolated subjectivity finds itself inadequate together with its object, because its endeavour for satisfaction is not matched before it has accepted itself as a collectivity (an “I” that is “We”, as Hegel says), and as a working subject – a development in which its poietic practice is already taken into consideration.

In the absence of adequate textual basis, it seems that it is Carrera’s interpretation of the “pure thought” as “pure” Being in the *SL* which has stirred his animosity (Note 13). Carrera interprets Hegel’s consolidated subject, his collectivity of “We”, as “completely inverted” – “as if it were a particular concrete form of an impersonal rationality” (69).

It requires an explanation why an intersubjective poietic consciousness should be called “impersonal”. In a theoretical excavation of the grounds of the Marxian thinking about workers’ class-consciousness, Hegel’s universal “We” should not a priori be met with suspicious glances. It soon turns out (70) that Carrera here is inspired by the Marx who published *Misère de la philosophie* and the *Heilige Familie* in the 1840’s – when his lack of clarity in the criticism of Hegel was precisely as conspicuous as his acceptance of Ricardo’s theorems. Marx’s 1844 contention concerning an “impersonal reason” in Hegel is built on a misunderstanding, as is justly implied by Roberto Fineschi (162).

This whole affair is all the more remarkable, since it is a commonplace amongst the contributors to this work to maintain – correctly – that Marx renews his interest in Hegel’s thought in connection with the work on *Grundrisse*. It is quite clear that this renewal included a changed opinion of Hegel from Marx’s part. This means that the stronger one wants to focus on Marx’s reading of Hegel in 1857-58, the more critically one must view his interpretation from the mid-1840’s. But many contributors to this anthology follow a contrary line. The result is outright confusion, especially in articles by Fred Moseley and Patrick Murray.

5. Interpretations of Texts in Subjective Logic and Commodity Analysis

In his investigation of the primary result of Marx’s analysis of the commodity, Carrera ends up as follows:

... the analysis discovers socially necessary abstract labor, performed in a private and independent manner, to be the human activity that provides the commodity with its exchangeability, with its value (74; italics added).

If we look closer at Carrera’s premises, they turn out to be untenable. The human activity which represents value, he says, embodies a material reality, that of being a productive physiological expenditure of the human body, and a social quality, that of being that physiological expenditure applied to the production of use-values for other individuals, ... (74)

No one of Carrera’s references here can be applied to abstract labor. Rather, abstract labor is the abstraction from the concept of a *general* physiological concept of labor. What Carrera is doing, is to reproduce his error from the evaluation of the Hegelian pure being: He declares it
an idealist misconception, while it is in reality nothing but a concept of human abstraction from contents of the intuition (“Anschauung”). So while it is a sure thing that we cannot apply the same sort of start cables for igniting a work on logic as for one on economics, it becomes clear that the structure of their beginnings can well be comparable. As Hegel said: “Being as such is a quality”: it is implied in the name it is given. Similarly: Marx implies that being abstract is a quality of labor products, since they are produced by workers whose very existence is being abstracted and expropriated. Their work process, a concretum of physical activity and teleological thought-made-abstract, is itself an expression of abstractions. That is a socio-historical fact. To renounce it will bring us too close to vulgar materialism. Just as Carrera closes his eyes to Hegel’s thesis that abstraction is included in any material cognition, so he denounces the Marxian view that any analysis of a “movement of commodities” implies a recognition of the abstraction “value”.

The problematic points in Carrera’s chapter are all too well matched by Geert Reuten’s “Outline of the Systematic-Dialectical Method: Scientific and Political Significance” (243-268). This chapter is set as if it were part of a text-book on sociological case-method which could be read with equal pleasure by dialecticians, positivists or plain empiricists alike, while the references to Marx’s “analytic” or “synthetic” method(s) lacks inner coherence. Consequently, the especial dialectical status that might be thought to pertain to certain categories, remains invisible, and Reuten steps into critical terrain as soon as he engages with categories which have true dialectical implications. There are three all too conspicuous ones: While the author underlines his preference for what he calls Hegel’s ”Logic of Essence” when it comes to point out inspiration for Marx’s employment of philosophical categories, he displays ignorance of the most important categories of this logic of reflection. He treats Hegel’s positing-prepositing (setzende, voraussetzende) reflexions as non-existing (cf. his treatment of corresponding terms (250, note 11); he writes (260) that “[w]hile necessity is central to Hegel’s Essence-Logic, there is no room for contingency in his work”. However, for Hegel the concept of Zufall is precisely the precondition for Necessity, and it is especially investigated in the first subsection on “Actuality” (cf. WiL II, 202-207) inside the said “Essence-Logic”. As if this were not enough, Reuten declares: “There is no textual evidence whatsoever deriving from Capital that Marx there adopts a dialectical Subjective Logic” (264). This is a tenuous postulate. As we have seen, Marx’s chapter on the commodity might fairly be taken as an immanent criticism of Hegel’s analysis of the judgment, while it could not have entered such a role without taking its point of departure in relations corresponding to Hegel’s text-block Begriff inside his “Subjectivity”. Furthermore, and as hinted at above, since the exposition of capital goes on in tripartite form (syllogisms) through the whole of Marx’s work, included what corresponds to “capital in universality” of the Grundrisse (namely, at least Volumes I and II of Capital), in the form of C-M-C or M-C-M (commodity/money-circulations) as well as teleological syllogisms (the labor process in general and as subsumed under capital) there is no place for a dualistic structure, which, hopefully, Reuten will accept as the fulcrum of “Essence-Logic” (Note 14).

Needless to say by now, this anthology presents severe problems for a reader interested in clarity and consistency as regards the relation between SL and Capital. On the other hand, Roberto Fineschi’s “On Hegel’s Methodological Legacy in Marx” (140-163) is definitely
praiseworthy. This chapter presents a fine feeling for important differences, however subtle, in the various draft plans considered by Marx after 1857 for his main work, and combines this with a very useful oversight over additional relevant texts in the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*. All in all, and considered that its theme is of a philological-hermeneutical nature rather than a strictly methodological one, it is perhaps the best chapter in the book. The reader can fearlessly approach it as a lucid and knowledgeable text, giving the clearest insight into the structure of “Capital in its universality” and its original partitions.

6. Varying Concepts of Substance

In the course of this book, misunderstandings concerning the nature of Hegel’s subjective logic turn up on every corner, even unexpectedly. In an interesting and scholarly hermeneutical essay by Igor Hanzel on a "cluster" of categories from the “Essence-Logic” primarily (214-239), the author concludes by assuring the reader that Marx’s *Capital* draws neither on Hegel’s movement from the clusters of categories in the Objective Logic to those in the Subjective Logic in the *Science of Logic*, nor on Hegel’s movements inside the cluster given in the Subjective Logic (238).

But Hanzel has shown nothing of the kind. Furthermore, to defend his abrupt thesis, he draws on Marx’s and Engels’ *Holy Family* from 1844, where the authors in a well-known passage characterize Hegel’s philosophy in general as a unity of Fichtean selfconsciousness and Spinozistic substance: “It is worth noting that Marx had a negative view ... of Hegel’s category substance-subject given in the Subjective Logic” (239).

This is a questionable use of texts. First, it seems weird to localize the “category substance-subject” to Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept, where it is named otherwise, as long as its *locus classicus* is the preface to the *Phenomenology* of 1807; second, there is nothing to lead a reader of the *Holy Family* to the conclusion that the concept of substance as it is presented in *SL* is the object of Engels’-Marx’s criticism; thirdly, we have once more to do with what I would label a “naivity of spheres”.

It is necessary to expand on this last point. As Tony Smith emphasizes in his very readworthy contribution “Hegel, Marx and the Comprehension of Capitalism” (17-40).

Hegel’s and Marx’s theories develop in quite different directions. Hegel’s affirmative systematic dialectic moves forward through the overcoming of contradictions to arrive at progressively more rational (onto-)logical forms. Marx’s theory also ‘progresses’ in the sense that later determinations allow a more complex and concrete comprehension of generalised commodity-production than earlier ones do. But in Marx’s *critical* dialectic later determinations do not provide explanatory frameworks in which higher-order truths can be articulated in the manner of Hegel’s Logic – just the opposite (37).

In other words, nothing could be more natural than Marx having a “negative view” of Hegel’s substance, given that it reflects the development of capital, which is an expansive force that has to be met by revolutionary action. And nothing could be more natural than his having a positive view of it as a theoretical stage disclosing the true nature of capital, underpinning revolutionary action in the long run.

In the same vein, categories adequately reflecting realities inside capital in general may well inhere determinations that are regressive seen in relation to the form of that category. For
instance, the hypothetical judgment in Hegels view is in fact tending to be a pure proposition (“of empty form”), (cf. Hegel 1970b, 337). Its nearest relative in the Marxian system is the “value relation” exposed in his “commodity”-chapter, because the categorical equality between commodities is only there if they are values. But to decide whether they are values, we need a commodity in an equivalent-form, which gets its determination through the activity of the other commodity (viz., commodity-owner), so that it appears “so to speak as a determination of reflexion” of that other (Marx 1966). And since Hegel’s category of such a determination of reflexion (“Reflexionsbestimmung”) follows as a product of the presupposing reflection, and is a “posited being” (Gesetztsein) in line with a “contingency” (Hegel tells us), the situation is that the analysis has to accept a multi-level-form as regards categories. In the present case, this is just to point out that capital has reached the level of the concept, but without capacity of being developed to more than the abstract concept.

Hanzel’s view is set in perspective by a formulation from Grundrisse, whose content was never given up by Marx:

Therefore, those who demonstrate that the productive force ascribed to capital is a displacement, a transposition of the productive force of labor, forget precisely that capital itself is essentially this displacement, this transposition, and that wage labor as such presupposes capital, so that, from its standpoint as well, capital is this transubstantiation; the necessary process of positing its own powers as alien to the worker (Marx, 1953).

Thus capital’s substantiality, and thereby its prevailing in accidentality and alterations, is by no means just a “pretension”, but the essence of capital itself.

“Hegel’s ’substance-subject” is, then, a central and critical category in the Marxian corpus, but reflected against Hegel, and understood as a partitioning of it(self) into subject and predicate, expressing themselves in contradiction between the character-masks of labor and capital respectively (Note 15).

It is all the more problematic for Hanzel’s position that the ‘property’ of value remaining identical, and therefore identical even in magnitude while taking on different form-determinations as a “substance-subject”, is present for Marx even in the simple value forms (exchange value). Marx writes against classical political economists on …their inability to form a correct conception of money, in which what is in question is only various changes in the form of exchange-value, while the magnitude of value remains unchanged (Marx, 1968c).

This piece of text is (to change our target) quoted by Patrick Murray and expounded in the following way:

… classical political economy […] does not grasp the necessary formal difference between a commodity and the money for which it is exchanged (though their value-magnitudes are the same) (211).

Murray misunderstands Marx’s text. A commodity is not exchanged against money. Money means that commodities are taken up in circulation. Circulation can, if one wants to, be defined as an “exchange” of commodities by means of money. Murray defines money in the same way as do the economists criticised by Marx. Indeed, if money exchanged directly against commodity, how could an economist conceivably fail to take value magnitude to
remain unchanged? For classical economy that problem arises only because the intervention of money, in which commodity values are measured, without being exchanged, led them to overlook the possibility that value magnitude still was constant.

Unhappily, Murray wants to “associate” these kinds of error amongst the classics with their identifying profit and surplus value – “though their value-magnitudes are the same” (Murray, 211). This polemical coincidence is in fact useful for a reviewer, for it soon comes to light that it is misunderstandings of Marx’s value theory, certainly not by Murray alone, which for contributors constitute the basis for errors in the “doctrine of profit” – the very category on which the contributors here concentrate in their polemics contra Ricardo.

To substantiate this, let us take up C. J. Arthurs’s text on Marx, Hegel, and the “Value Form” (269-291), or rather, his critique of Marx’s analysis in the first chapter of Capital.

Arthur contends that “theoretical priority must be accorded to ‘form analysis’ because it is the practice of exchange that establishes the necessary form of social synthesis in the first place, before labors expended are commensurated in it” (269). However, he overlooks that “labors expended” are, in the nature of things, concrete labors. They cannot be “commensurated”, for they are part and parcel with the natural concretum made up by each commodity. They cannot be “commensurated” any more than the wool-material in a coat can be identified with the organic tissue in a piece of linen. Consequently, what acts as a common entity, identifying commodities and making possible an equation like Marx’s ”simple value form”, namely,

20 yards of linen = 1 coat

(i.e., e.g., “x material L = y material C”),

is not any concrete labor, nor any abstraction from any concrete “expended” labors, but on the contrary an abstraction from living, active labor. This is the tertium comparationis, because it has to be labor, but cannot be labor in congealed form.

Arthur seeks to exploit his thesis of “labor expended” through arguing that Marx’s value expression (as e.g. the one mentioned above) is

... defective because it has not yet been shown that the two commodities are ‘of identical magnitude’, only that they stand in a relation of exchange; such a presupposed third thing is not yet posited at such an elementary level. (It is money that provides the necessary community of commodities and which makes possible comparison of their magnitude in a ‘third thing’” (276).

But the basic point does not consist in exposing an entity (which would certainly be a durable “thing”) for comparing of magnitudes; rather, the problem is to point out a tertium which has always already made it possible to qualitatively equalize commodities (like coat and linen) so that they can be compared in a physical measure of value which is itself a product of labor.

It may even seem as though Arthur takes the expression “third thing” literally, while it is nothing more than the translation into English of the German “in einem Dritten”, literally ”in a third”, which does not necessarily mean a “thing” but e.g. just an entity, as a conscious processus (like living labor). At any rate, Arthur puts the relation on its head, since “money” cannot be a value-measure if it has not already got a substance (abstract labor) common with commodities.

To indicate the insuperable problems created in Arthur’s text, it is sufficient to show his
version of the simple value form (278):

**Form I The simple Form of Expression of Value**

*z of commodity A expresses its value in y of commodity B.*

As long as Arthur does not notice the difference in principle between this form and the one employed by Marx (“20 yards of linen = 1 coat”), he is actually transforming the basis of Marxian economic theory into an axiomatic system. The axiomatics can be written as follows: “Every commodity has a value to express”. That sentence is scarcely unreasonable, we know. But Marx’s point is that “value” is something whose existence perforce dawns on the observer through an interrelation of equivalence of two goods or material use values. This steers the sequence of Erscheinungsformen, forms of appearance, which we meet progressively in the analysis. The concept of ‘value’ being served on a plate, it is small wonder that Arthur ends up with creating a phenomenon of “money” (not even necessarily a commodity!) whose own movement alone posits the money functions. It is difficult not to take this as a genuflection to modern petty-bourgeois dreams of a perpetuum mobile of money (finance) capital (Note 16).

Let us now compare Arthur’s approach with Riccardo Bellofiore’s attempt to “reconstruct the dialectics of value, money and capital” (176) of Marx. This motif is unclear, since what Marx actually wrote about these themes, is reasonably clear. It soon turns out that the problem must be that for Bellofiore misreadings of Marx are a potential danger, which will let us “remain inescapably in a Ricardian setting – as practically all Marxist economists do today” (182). The implication, that it is natural being a Ricardian while being a Marxist (or vice-versa) tells a lot of contemporary leftist mindsets.

Bellofiore’s own settling of accounts with those leanings is characterized by lack of clarity. Still, he accepts Marx’s view of capital as “…an ‘encompassing’ Subject … as a self-moving and self-activating substance”. However, he immediately confounds this “subject” with its form in Hegel’s Subjective Logic (170, cf. 171), which, on the contrary, supersedes this view of substance.

The main aim of Bellofiore’s article (164-188) seems to be to integrate Marx’s concept of abstract labor as the value-positing substance with the concept of capital as substance. So it stands to reason that he knits the concept of money to the said Subjective Logic, saying that “Money is nothing but a Hegelian syllogism made actual” (177). However, Bellofiore forgets to give us the source, which is the second chapter of the Zur Kritik from 1859, where Marx writes of circulation, i.e. money:

C-M-C can …, abstract logically (abstrakt logisch), be reduced to the syllogistic form P[articularity]-U[universality]-I[ndividuality], where particularity makes up the first extreme, universality the unifying medium and individuality the last extreme (Marx 1972, 76).

As the notation implies, money has placed us in the sphere of buying and selling, so we are no longer in the field of any immediate exchange. Thus we have reason to be surprised when Bellofiore continues in this way:

Since money as a commodity is value embodied, the abstract labor contained in the commodities exchanged against that money is also exhibited in the concrete labor embodied in gold (177).
Nonetheless, this is a contradiction in terms: Bellofiore cannot get “exchange”, here. He has expressly introduced money, i.e., circulation, so the gold is now active as measure of value, \textit{numérale} and means of circulation: categories which he does not mention at all in his exposition, and which were mysteries to Ricardo (Note 17).

Furthermore, Bellofiore’s insistence (formally correct) on the form of the syllogism will force him to take another crucial step: Since the “Hegelian syllogism” always is a combination of \textit{judgments}, he has to give quite a new interpretation to the Marxian value expressions, which he actually has used as preconditions for the emergence of his “syllogism”. And if so, he cannot avoid taking them to be exemplars of the Kantian/Hegelian judgments of “relation” or of “necessity” (Note 18).

Bellofiore in fact says that “exchange becomes universal [only] in capitalism, according to Marx” (178), actually implying that simple exchange is meant, it being clear that he confuses simple exchange with circulation.

Amidst these misunderstandings, Bellofiore even writes that “money [is] the universal equivalent)” (177), a sentence the reader should compare with the second passage of Marx’s third chapter in \textit{Capital}, “Money or Circulation of Commodity”:

The first main function of gold is to supply commodities with the material for the expression of their values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively equal and quantitatively comparable. It thus acts as a universal measure of value, and only through performing this function does gold, the specific equivalent commodity, become money (Marx, 1973) (Note 19).

Bellofiore’s exposition is spiced with further misunderstandings, which are traditional and well known from Ricardian circles. He has no clear understanding of gold as a measure \textit{of values}, nor as a standard of prices (cf. 180); he tells the reader that gold, after its production, is ”exchanged with other products of labor of equal value“ (cf. also 177), which obviously is erroneous: Gold is here a capitalist product and is consequently sold at a production price. On gold’s entering circulation, he says that “\textit{from now on, its value is always already given}”, which is just another impossibility, given our world of competing “many capitals”. He writes in incomprehensible language about a passage from ideal money to real money; instead of talking, as he should, of certain weights of gold whose prices are irrelevant for the measuring process, he writes about amounts of labor which (we know) do not appear unless in pieces of gold with a certain weight, etc.

As any interested reader should know from debates on Marx and bourgeois economics, a fixed price system cannot be conceived unless the \textit{numérale} consists of regular pieces of the material (“use value”) of the commodity performing as measure of value. Marx’s underlines this often enough, amidst ironical comments on the confusion of economists. If the \textit{numérale} does not function as material as such (not as material with value or “price”) it is impossible to show the genesis of the rate of profit, since a measure of value which as such varies (in contradistinction to fixed relations inside homogeneous ounces) forces the economist to adapt a system of equations with postulated variables.

Therefore, the Marxian irony could never have been more justified than in the study of the anthology here presented by “Historical Materialism”: In a book starting out from the use of
Hegelian categories to show the weakness of Ricardo, one ends up with little more than an apology for Ricardianism mediated through an undigested Hegel.

The fatal misunderstandings of Marx’s theory of value does even, in at least two cases, result in quite elaborate thought-experiments which could be taken as hodgy-podgy-attempts to justify the misery.

One of these surfaces in Fred Moseley’s chapter on “the Universal and the Particulars” (115-139), where the author tries to take advantage of Marx’s well-known remark that one of the “best” things in Capital is “the treatment of surplus value independent of its particular forms as profit, interest, ground rent etc”(Marx, 1867b). Remarkably, Moseley thinks the meaning of this is exhaustively expressed in the thesis that the total magnitude of surplus value is perforce unchanged (in constant relations of production), if the amount of a “particular form” varies.

Marx’s method is thoroughly misunderstood here. Moseley takes its base to be as follows:

…quantity is the main thing about capitalism. More precisely, the main phenomenon of capitalism that Marx’s theory explains is [total]M, the total quantity of surplus value produced in the capitalist economy as a whole (122).

This is one example of modern Ricardianism, in so far as the qualitative side of exploitation, the quality of value production and the factors making possible the exploitation qualitatively, are simply left aside. The possibility of value production, the expropriation of the worker, labor’s character of wage labor, the modes of production of different kinds of surplus value, etc. disappear from the economic base.

The reader does well to compare this with the distorted “value forms” presented by Arthur, where the quantitative equivalence between commodities, not the latter’s precondition, i.e. not their qualitative coexistence with an equation mark, has become the basic point. We stand before the same illusion which makes itself felt in the definition of the Hegelian “Being” as something other than a quality, opening the gates to Kantian quantitative syntheses.

However, a question remains: Since Marx’s passage is so thoroughly misunderstood by Moseley, it is also reduced to a remarkable banality. Of course, if all capitalistically produced surplus value is X, then the total amount of derivates amount to just the same X, measured in prices derived from the golden rod, i.e. the physical numéraire. So what?

To confirm the mess, and to help explain it, let us for a moment return to Murray’s article on “How Hegel Helped Marx to Overturn Ricardo’s Theory of Profit” (189-213). Here, a special version of the theory of commodity prices developed in Capital is presented. It is apparently produced ex machina as a conclusion centered on elucidating a possible contradiction between the fact that commodity prices are = values in the two first volumes of Capital, while in the third volume Marx gives us a “transformation of commodity-values into production prices” (Marx,1968a).

As indicated by the very last quote, such a contradiction is non-existent. Its only raison d’être inside the mindset of economists are their own disability to grasp Marx’s doctrine of the relation between measure of value and numéraire of prices. As mentioned above, such misunderstandings result in the coercion to construct undetermined equation sets as models for the capitalist mode of production. In Murray’s case, the contention is that commodity
values are presented as aliquot parts of the aggregate of prices on the capitalist market, so that there is in fact no real “transformation” to production prices, and no need to consider the relation between measure and numéraire. Needless to say, there is not the slightest material in Capital to underpin such an idea.

Actually, Murray’s stance is quite in line with the one of Moseley, who through his zealous references to his own earlier publications, involving confusion of circulation and exchange, makes it clear that the truism of identity of total profit with total surplus value is needed by him only for the sake of acquiring one determined variable inside the equation system for the totality of the “many capitals”. For in the traditional, misunderstood formulations of the “transformation problem” it is an absolute condition that the total sum of profit in a given period of production may vary with the price of gold.

7. Conclusions

When a reviewer is to sum up the quality of a book edition, structures like these last mentioned count as severe punishment to editors. It is not only a question of untenable opinions by individual contributors, but of the decency and proper coherence of a literary whole (Note 20). As regards the totality of this book, just one third of the contributions are scholarly acceptable through and through. (And they are of high quality at that.) Another third should have been returned to the authors, while the last third consists of texts very unevenly composed. However, these last ones do contain much interesting material and nice aperçus of constellations inside the Marxian theory all too often overlooked – on the structure of alienation, on the conceptions of organism, on combination of categories, and more – even if insights into Hegel’s thought are not always adequate.

While it is therefore unfair immediately to advise against acquiring this book, the reader should remain skeptical especially on account of the tendency to mechanical materialism which steadily surfaces; in a study of the Hegel-Marx-relation, “materialism” should be investigated as a possible result of the basic tendencies in Hegel’s thought, not a priori as a Marxian rapist action from outside of objective idealism. Furthermore, the absence of openings towards an investigation of capitalist society as a whole and consequently to forms of political action, as they implicitly are present in both Logik and Kapital, ought to have been thematized. That could have opened up a discussion where the logical coherence of the Marxian corpus would have stood forward; the capacity of Marxian theory to deliver unambiguous results precisely through non-dogmatic exploration would have come into its right. In this book of essays, somewhat too light-handed studies of Hegel’s writings lead to his strict and ingenious theses on the correspondence between quality, quantity and measure being overlooked. If capital is indeed a Maßloses, a measureless striving for profit, then we need concepts that show how it is kept it within bounds.

References


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Notes

Note 1. See Sandemose 2014 for a published example.

Note 2. “Dirimere” is originally a Latin word for “to differentiate”; in German Idealism, it was commonly used as a synonym for *urteilen*, where the originality of the partition was an understatement.

Note 3. The correct title for the movement-form inside Hegel’s Concept is not mentioned in Meaney where those forms are separately treated (cf. 53).

Note 4. Hegel therefore goes on with equalizing this intuition with “empty thought”, i.e. with the negation, “Nichts” (cf. 83). For a detailed analysis, see also Theunissen 1978, 99 sq.

Note 5. As translated by Cyril Smith and Don Cuckson. (It seems to me that “contemplation” should have been replaced by “intuition”. “Sensuous intuition” will be a good translation of the single German word “die Anschauung”, which as such is used here by Marx.)

Note 6. It is a problem that contributors to the anthology virtually ignore specialist scholarly literature on Hegel’s work.

Note 7. Cf. 103, where some dubious quoting of Hegel is also to be found.

Note 8. This view has no positive connection with Kant’s theory of human cognition of the known world of appearances. The point is here only that we are a part of the world, in which all elements are in interaction. Human physio-cognitive negations form no part of the Kantian idealism, but certainly of the thinking of Hegel and Marx. A short elucidation: Human interventions are just as essential for what happens in nature as any real, physical causality, and as any form of extra-human animal life. Furthermore, the world as it existed before life was introduced, must have had the germs of life inside it. In this meaning, the negating activity, in germ-form, has always been a physical aspect of the universe, while it later, in its actuality, has been a real aspect in addition. In the physical composition of our negating activity no element of the physical world is absent, and its likeness to this world is without discontinuity.
Note 9. Hegel’s italics added here; see Hegel 1970b, 174.

Note 10. The totality that was Marx’s vision in the *Grundrisse*, is, consequently, maintained in Capital I-III, despite a change in Marx’s way of focusing on the three main categories in the two texts. Marx says in *Grundrisse* that “[t]he inner construction of modern society, or, capital in the totality of its relations, is … posited in the economic relations of modern landed property” (Marx 1953, 187). Such a formulation points to a well-known methodological reflection by Marx about the logical sequence of “the economic categories” in capitalist society in relation to their historical sequence. In the *Grundrisse* he says: “It would … be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development” (Marx 1953, 28). These sentences have traditionally been seriously misunderstood. (See however Meiners 1980, 272 sqq., where a sound interpretation is presented.) With “the categories” Marx here means Capital, Wage Labour and Landed Property (and *a fortiori* their forms of revenue: profits and interest, wages and ground rent), a fact that can be deduced from the context, namely, a polemic against the “categorical” method of classical political economy. Robert Albritton comments on Marx’s *dictum*, saying that in *Capital*, “the three first categories – ‘commodity’, ‘money’, ‘capital’ – do appear in history in that order” (Albritton 1999, 187). The implied error leads him to ignore Marx’s words about a sequence being “precisely … opposite”. Instead, he just says that the two sequences do “not follow” each other (Albritton 1999, 58). The practical consequences of a misunderstanding like this is clearly made out by the fact that Albritton ignores the closing function of the category of ground rent and transfers it to the interest on capital. He writes: “In order to deal with the surplus profits associated with unavoidable qualitative differences between parcels of land [here, Albritton simply “forgets” absolute rent] or land-like resources, capital must generate the category rent. Finally, with interest-bearing capital, capital itself becomes a commodity. … A dialectic that started with the commodity comes full circle, ending with the commodification of capital itself” (Albritton, 1999). A similar position is presented in Sekine 1997, Vol 2, p.132 sq. John R. Bell stands for views very close to Albritton’s and Sekine’s, writing that “[t]he concession of rent to landowners enable capital to develop a new self-image of interest-bearing wealth” (Bell 1995, 133). Such theses are, of course, flatly contradicted by the structure of the third volume of *Capital*, where interest is analysed before the transition to ground rent. In practice, the view of Albritton and Bell indicates severe problems for their methodological theses about a possible category “pure capitalism”. In fact, in Marx’s work, capital as a category is coming “full circle” already in the circuit of commodity capital, representing a totality as against other forms of capital circuits (cf. Marx 1968b, Chapter III). Consequently, it is used as the foundation for his well-known reproduction schemes, which can be considered as the actualisations of precisely that circuit. Further, the two authors’ attempt to reconstruct Marx’s “dialectics” in *Capital* utterly fails, since such a conceptual movement by Marx is so evidently dependent on the position he ascribes to modern landed property. (It might be noted that Marx’s remarks on “the categories” led to problems also for Klaus Hartmann. In his “philosophical investigation” on
Marx, he produced an “excursion” on the subject, but his results were inappropriate. (Cf. Hartmann 1970, 250, 254 sqq.) The misinterpretation is also to be found in Postone 2003, 18.

Note 11. In Rosenthal 1998 (Chapter 6, 3) there is a good exposition of the price structures resulting from the existence of ground rent, and of the “character mask” of the landowner. However, Rosenthal is wrong when he thinks that, for Marx, after the introduction of “a capitalist order”, “the specific social relations which define it as capitalist in no way depend upon the existence of landed property” (Rosenthal, 1998).

Note 12. Moreover, the reference is faulty. It is not to the foreword of 1867, but to the afterword of 1873.

Note 13. See Carrera’s notes 21-25. See also his use of “pure knowledge” in his section 3.2 (73).

Note 14. However, one should note that Hegel does not succeed in making a credible passage from Logic of Reflection through the general theory of the concept, and finally to the judgment. (I.e. the vital passage between Logic of Reflection and Logic of the Concept.) Marx is clearly aware of this deficiency. Consequently, it can be said that he is also well aware of problems relating to effective separation between the spheres of Essence, resp. Concept. I have touched upon this elsewhere. Suffice it here to point to the criticism of Hegel presented even in Hartmann 1999, 265.

Note 15. Smith (cf. 22-23) upholds a sound view of these relations.

Note 16. In his proceedings towards this improbable entity, Arthur comments on the important Form IV in Marx’s chapter on the commodity from 1867, distorting it through and through (cf. 284). Nonetheless, he says that the form in question is the one used by Marx, and that it is “suppressed” in all later editions. Thereupon, and on the very next page (285), he himself quotes from a passage in Marx’s following chapter, “The exchange Process”, where the Form IV is repeated by Marx in a purely verbal manner. This passage was never removed or altered by Marx.

Note 17. A confounding of selling/buying with “exchange” in the abstract is to be found even by Smith. For instance, he identifies “exchange for money” with “sale of … products for money” (21).


Note 19. Translation amended. Translator Fowkes has “first main functions”.

Note 20. It must be pointed out that Moseley (cf. 122-123) even attempts to underpin his views through plain misunderstandings of translations of German terms, inclusive of confusing their adverbial and substantive use. That all this has been accepted by an editor with Tony Smith’s capacity, borders on the incomprehensible.
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