Does Institutions Effect Growth in Pakistan? An Empirical investigation

Danish Ahmed Siddiqui, Qazi Masood Ahmed


This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies for Pakistan, covering its two main dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies and in turn covers several social, institutional, political and economic aspects. It is also analyzed empirically whether the overall index as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affects economic growth. The results show that over all, institutions promote growth in long run for Pakistan. Therefore, for a policy implication, success of any policy could be influenced by the soundness of institutions.

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