

Toxic Leadership Driven by WB Donor Group (OHS): Implications for Managing a Dam Project in Pakistan

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Abstract

This is a research paper that is focused on assessing toxic leadership impacts of a WB Donor group (OHS) on a major Dam construction project in Pakistan. An interpretive methodology was utilised in order to assist in understanding the level, intensity and impact leadership on the project. The scope for this research was the on-site supervisory team. The targeted population of interest was made up of 16 lower-managers/engineers located at one on-site main office during the construction phase of a Dam project. The research outcomes comprised of four 4 main-themes and the corresponding 17 sub-themes, with 259 discussion targets. The research outcome raises substantial issues associated with the toxic leadership of a WB Donor group and addresses these implications that affect the project construction internal/external stakeholder management. The project appears to be run by the WB Donor group through “Munchausen syndrome by proxy” where unprofessional dogma is the focus of the management operations. This is also indicated by the leveraging the management of one project, to provide finance for another project, which is reinforced through toxic leadership.

Keywords: Toxic Leadership, Construction Project, WB Donor Behaviour, Pakistan

1. Introduction

Complex Project management in Asia is difficult and challenging, where projects are managed, as most high cost, highly complex projects are constructed with the Employer team inadequately qualified and prepared to manage it (Turner, 2014; Long, et al., 2004). The expected value delivery systems (PMI, 2022) for infrastructure complex projects involve transitioning from more effective uses of natural conditions, heightening the performance derivatives of present or new structures, and helping deliver more effective structural, social and environmental outcomes (Long, et al., 2004).

However, for supervision engineers of complex projects - those that provide employers with “assistance” - usually according to FIDIC contracts, this means that the role of the supervision engineer requires the ability to understand project management from a western point of view and translate this on the project. This has huge implications as this provides the WB donor with the ability to positively or negatively influence the project, without taking responsibility for its failures (Hughes, Rana and Simintiras, 2017; Rezvani and Khosravi, 2019). This scenario appears to be played out in Asia on more than one project, but this research focuses on the devastating influence of a WB Donor group on one of the World’s largest Dam construction projects, situated in Pakistan.

When considering the success factors in complex projects, rational narrative approaches indicate that specific outcomes such as cost/quality/schedule triangle (Cooke-Davies, 2002) are strenuously impacted, on projects where toxic leadership is present or not being addressed (Singh, Sengupta and Dev, 2018); and where effective measures to address the toxic leadership behaviour remain difficult, if not impossible to eradicate (Burns, 2017).

1.1 Toxic Leadership

Toxic leadership is seen as the embodiment of a narcissistic pathology (Yukl, 1999) and culture (Erkutlu and Chafra, 2017) with subsequent dysfunctional (Goldman, 2009) and destructive behaviour and actions by managerial stakeholders who hold harmful intentions (Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007; Conger, 1990). This harmful orientation becomes the operational “norm” (Sankowski, 1995) through defensive (Pelletier and Bligh, 2008) damaging behaviour (Reed, 2004). A feature of toxic leadership is that the consequences of their behaviour goes on unnoticed or unacknowledged (Goldman, 2009), powered by narcissistic abuse of power (Tiwari and Jha, 2022) and internalised self-entitlement (Mao et al., 2023) through groupthink behaviour (Janis, 1982). The toxic leadership often reflects managerial inadequacy or incapability to manage people effectively (Lipman-Blumen, 2006) resulting in aggressive outbursts that damage relationships and trust through collusive actions (Locatelli, et al., 2017). These destructive tendencies are also expressed when issues such as fraud (Pelletier and Bligh, 2008) or when performance lapses are made public (Harris, Kacmar and Zivnuska, 2007). This creates exposed work environments that are susceptible to stress and harassment (Bowling and Beehr, 2006), intimidation and fear (Whicker, 1996; Hogan, Hogan and Kaiser, 2003), caused by toxic leadership issues (Singh, Sengupta and Dev, 2018).

Toxic leadership often starts as autocratic intentions of the project leader (Harms, et al., 2018), who then causes divisive measures to operate surreptitiously, defining a separation of those in power and those who are harassed and pressured to behave differently to appropriate project behaviour. This negative behaviour opposes and resists good technical project practices, that are often disguised in operation as they engage with different “organisational objectives” (Gallus, et al., 2013).

The early stages appear to be underpinned by unethical leadership (Brown, Trevino and Harrison, 2005). The negative consequences of toxic leadership indicates employee withdrawal from the company to seek better work environments (Branham, 2005), reduction in personnel focus on performance (Snow, 2021) and where negative responses increase the tension in the work environment resulting in higher cost and greater overt aggressive conflict (Burns, 2017). This leads to the project work situation becoming more difficult and spirals out of control (Buckingham and Coffman, 1999; Kurtulmuş, 2020). Further, in large, complex construction projects, toxic leadership has resulted in the ineffective management of the project operations (James, 2022; Vidal and Marle, 2008). These include creating project overruns (Lehmann, 2017) through delays (James, 2022b). This is highlighted by non-performing professional personnel (Shaw, Erickson and Harvey, 2011) and making the project more expensive (Reed, 2004) by using compulsory, unethical behaviour (Boddy, Ladyshewsky and Galvin, 2010).

1.2 Stakeholder Management Issues

Complex projects cannot operate without a well-developed plan and the managerial intentions and resources to carry out the project tasks against identified stakeholders requirements (PMI, 2022). However, normal behaviour for stakeholders may be the exact behaviour that leads to toxic entanglements and leadership issues in projects (Einarsen, Aasland and Skogstad, 2007), which can also be a platform for corruption and fraud activities (James, 2018). These are often created where an Employer (as an internal stakeholder) adopts a different role to that expected on a complex project that conflicts with the supervision engineer, resulting from Employer dissatisfaction (Müller, et al., 2016). In Asia, many complex and expensive projects often result in this status. In effect the lack of capability and wrong expectations of the Employer, results in an ineffective project outcome such as overruns, difficult or impossible relationships where contractual issues are raised and overly focused on, rather than project-based problems (Galvin, Tywoniak and Sutherland, 2021) which has raised the spectre of opportunism to create conflict and confusion (Gil, 2009).

Stakeholders represent differing goals and settings (PMI, 2022), and where power-plays become an irrational process, pressuring the imbalance of their aims and objectives. Toxic leaders appear to enhance negative behaviour (Edwards, et al., 2015) across the stakeholder spectrum and where powerful stakeholders become seemingly more powerful through toxic leadership engagement (Maner and Mead, 2010).

Within the context of complex project in Asia, very little research has been conducted on toxic leadership behaviours and associated with destructive leaders (Harris, Kacmar and Zivnuska, 2007); and inherent negative effects of toxic leaders (Rumsey, 2013). Consequently, this

research is centred on examining the effects of project management toxic leadership" consequences (Harms, Spain and Hannah, 2011).

1.3 External Donor Stakeholder Management

Where external stakeholders as important as a donor have aims and objectives that differ from the Project, then toxic leadership is reinforced (Bourne and Walker, 2006). This is especially an issue when the donor wants to manage the Project in place of the Engineer leading to a failed project (Lipman-Blumen, 2006). This has been assessed as due primarily through deliberate actions such as performance reduction (Rafferty and Restubog, 2011) engineered through lack of agency at the start of the project (Mullaly, 2016). This also exacerbates the need of the ineffective donor leadership (Kellerman, 2004) to run the project without taking responsibility for the project outcomes (Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser, 2007) or having any project management experience. Power-driven government department officials, who lack the credibility and capability to manage complex projects in their own right, negatively influence internal project environments, making them conducive to toxic leadership development (Söderlund, Sankaran and Biesenthal, 2017). This indicates that collusion between the donor bank and the Employer have often made project management more difficult and ineffective leading to cost overruns and a lack of transparency associated with financial management and corruptive actions (James, 2018). Thus, political issues raises conflicts of interest between donor, Employer and the project management (Schwenk, 1989) - especially when there have been “*standing relations*” from previous won contracts with the Employer (Aaltonen & Sivonen, 2009).

*It is to be noted that the Dam Project context in Pakistan is funded by an American located Donor bank. The individuals who represent the bank on the project are “internationals” who are actually Pakistani, who have imposed full-time oversight and are involved in mismanagement at the Dam project through managerial manipulation and funding leverage that has increased the cost the project by over US\$25 million, to fund their activities in Pakistan.

This creates the context for the research question, *In what ways do Toxic Leadership from a donor affect the management, personnel and performance of a Dam Project in Pakistan?*

2. Method

Conducting research in the projects with toxic leadership cultures is fraught with difficulty and risk - to the researcher and the respondents (James and James, 2011). Thus, exploring the basis for toxic leadership in such environments in Pakistan, requires a qualitative orientation focused on individual personnel accounts and reflections (Walsh, White and Young, 2008). These individuals as “knowledge agents” (Benn et al., 2008) are considered authoritative in the personal experiences and opinions of “lived” experiences of toxic leadership enacted by the Donor group within the project context (Cassell and Symon, 2004).

2.1 Respondent Characteristics

The qualitative method employed a semi-structured interview process of a closed population (James and James, 2011) underpinned by an “inductive theory building” approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The research process focused on a “population of interest” (Carman, 1990)

contained within an objective research frame (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) of sixteen (16) whilst dispensing “*empirical adequacy*” (Spanos, 1990). Prior to the conduct of the main interviews, a pilot study was carried out (Maxwell, 2013) and where these two participants were excluded from the main interviews. The pilot focused on language and questioning logic that streamlined the questioning order and interview questioning and timing (Kim, 2011). The population characteristics were focused on project engineers who had direct on-site continuous project experience.

2.2 Interview Process

The interview process took around 45 mins, where each individual was asked in English, the same set of questions following Gray and Wilcox (1995), and responses were recorded with permission (Duranti, 2007). Additional probing questions were asked, as necessary, during the interviews, making each interview unique and coherent (Punch, 2014), leading to verbally negotiated outcomes (Silverman, 2006). All interviews were transcribed and returned to the respondents for review, comment and change as required (Harris and Brown, 2010). The data was interrogated through the use of appropriate qualitative software and independently coded (Flick, 2018) that resulted in theme and sub-theme developments and outcomes (Humble and Radina, 2019) directly attributed and characterised to each independent interview dialogue (Adu, 2019). No part of any interview dialogue was left uncoded and validity was improved through triangulation processes (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007) directed at documentation trails.

The research design substituted reliability with credibility (Johnson, 1997) and dependability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) to help build an evaluation in the “*interests of the public good*” and utilising a “*...good-faith effort to report wrongdoing...*” (Sinzdak, 2008) - as open as possible due to unethical management (Knoll, Schyns and Petersen, 2017). The results and discussion are taken together, as the separation of such is uncommon in qualitative research (Braun, et al., 2019).




Figure 1. Research Outcomes

Table 1. Research question, themes and discussion targets

Research Question			
<i>In what ways do Toxic Leadership from a donor affect the management, personnel and performance of a Dam Project in Pakistan?</i>			
Main Themes	Sub-Themes	Discussion Targets	
Leadership	Toxicity	14	
	Abuse	18	
	Power	16	
	Decision-making	12	
	Communication	10	
	Donor Behaviour	Attitude	15

	Collusive	11
	Bullies	23
	Blame Culture	21
OHS	Competency	17
	Knowledge	16
	Sharing	10
	Empowerment	18
	Safety	19
Internal Stakeholders	Employer - WAPDA	10
	Engineer - NK	18
	Community	11
Total	17	259

Table 1 above indicates the minimum responses for each identified sub-theme.

3. Results

The results are presented as below, providing extractions based on Gonzalez, (2008). Consequently, by considering the research question - as above - the results are stated here as four (4) main-themes, and seventeen (17) sub-themes with 259 discussion targets - as indicated in Table 1 above. Each sub-theme is examined within each respective associated main-theme where representative characteristic conversation elements are provided for factual context.

3.1 Main Theme – Leadership

In terms of Toxicity, this is typified by one respondent (3) who suggested that, *...they expect you to follow their instructions, but they don't have any responsibility, which is kinda dumb and creates so many issues on the project...* Another respondent (5) voiced that, *...I am told something and then they tell someone else something else.. They purposely create confusion and antagonism and they do it deliberately...*

In terms of Abuse, this is typified by one respondent (9) who intimated that, *...They are so aggressive, and they openly threaten people. This is not acceptable....* Another respondent (14) denoted that, *...WB cannot go on in this way. They order us like slaves, as we need to jump*

every time they want something. They even instructed WAPDA to get rid of all the UK staff on the project, and they specifically targeted the British OHS lead for the Engineer, because he saw their behaviour and he became a barrier to their implementation of unethical, misinformed and illegal actions...

In terms of Power, this is typified by one respondent (2) who suggested that, *...The WB men just demand. There is no subtlety, as Pakistani's they tell foreigners what to do. They think they are untouchable. They abuse everyone...* Another respondent (8) denoted that, *...They are power mad. It's gone to their heads. They are dangerous Pakistani's and so full of it. They have taken our money through hiding behind the WB, but there has been so much secrecy about their costs to the project and they have even flaunted a million-dollar vehicle that was brought to the project on the main road, that cannot be taken onto the project. The money for this comes directly from the project...*

In terms of Decision-making, this is typified by one respondent (7) who voiced that, *...the WB only makes decisions for their own benefit and not the project's. They are very selfish. They did this to make money on the back of the locals. We cannot accept this behaviour...* Another respondent (11) indicated that, *...their decisions are really awful. They do it without consulting us. They make decisions in secret and then shout and harass at people to do what they want. They are evil...*

In terms of Communication, this is typified by one respondent (1) who signalled that, *...We provided all the data they asked. But all we get is silence. I do not think they know what to do, and they are making it up. There is no communication that we understand...* Another respondent (3) denoted that, *...They come here give us demands. Then we do what they want. Even if they say something in return, it is like they are acting like the Police, even though they represent foreigners...*

3.2 Main Theme – Donor Behaviour

In terms of Attitude, this is typified by one respondent (3) who denoted that, *...They make dumb statements that are considered by many as inappropriate, self-serving and malicious. It is offensive to have such people here on the project..* Another respondent (11) declared that, *...They look down on us. People from Pakistan show us that they are in power and can affect our local people. This is fabrication and to use Pakistani's, the WB is corrupt...*

In terms of Collusive, this is typified by one respondent (6) who revealed that, *...The government is colluding with the WB to just get money, that we need - but to do it in this way, is not what Pakistani's do. This is a joke. People have been hurt by these people...* Another respondent (10) denoted that, *...What business is it that the American's can hold us to ransom like this. Our own people are helping them throttle our capability and they bring these untrained people to savage us...*

In terms of Bullies, this is typified by one respondent (4) who articulated that, *...The WB guys are just international bullies. They are paid enormous amounts of money without our consent. They only help themselves and are selfish and autocratic...* Another respondent (9) denoted that, *...No retribution for them. They do exactly as they please. These are privileged*

Pakistani's with no talent, make the local community suffer, while they extort Pakistan money to pay for their lavish Pakistani lifestyles overseas...

In terms of Blame Culture, this is typified by one respondent (8) who expressed that, *...We don't need them here. They are the cause for the explosion last year. The American's make it dangerous for us, and they response by being so arrogant and aggressive. They have a consistent pattern of aggression to anyone who finds out about their tyranny...* Another respondent (12) stated that, *...These people [WB] antagonises us. These are people who were brought up here and now they act like Americans. Know it all's. They hate us...*

3.3 Main Theme – OHS

In terms of Competency, this is typified by one respondent (7) who stated that, *...These guys cannot conduct training, have no qualifications in OHS, and are seen as money-stealers in Pakistan. They lack credibility and local staff are more qualified...* Another respondent (2) informed that, *...It is ridiculous that we have to accept these guys as international OHS specialists when they have no international experience or qualifications. They are Pakistani's who have gone to Canada. Why are they sent here to us? Why do we have to pay such high costs of US\$1600 a day? Why?...* Another respondent (6) detailed that, *...They behave like schoolchildren. They run around, doing show and tell. They act like primary school teachers. This is nonsense...*

In terms of Knowledge, this is typified by one respondent (1) who denoted that, *...our project requires OHS knowledge on many of its aspects. But we are not certified any major area relevant to our needs. It is as if they are keeping us down...*

In terms of Sharing, this is typified by one respondent (12) who suggested that, *...they don't want to share anything with us. No new knowledge. Nothing. Once, we checked and they had copied materials from a university in the US. How is that relevant for dam project in Pakistan?...* Another respondent (6) expressed that, *...Their focus can be summed up when they insisted on doing online OHS training, during a major incident and penalised anyone who went to the incident...*

In terms of Empowerment, this is typified by one respondent (4) who intimated that, *...No. We are not empowered. They don't listen to us. and they never will. They use the WB to keep us down and unqualified. Simple as that...*

In terms of Safety, this is typified by one respondent (12) who advocated that, *...No. We are not safer. far from it. WB brings security problems with them and it comes here. We have many deaths because of this failure...* Another respondent (3) denoted that, *...Many locals have been harmed - some have died, some are physically injured, never to work again. WB don't care. WAPDA don't care. No our workers are not safe here...*

3.4 Main Theme – Internal Stakeholders

In terms of Employer - WAPDA, this is typified by one respondent (7) who signified that, *...No one with the department has any OHS qualifications No one. I was told that, this was an instruction from WB because they did not need anyone else except the WB group to run the*

project... Another respondent (1) indicated that, ...our workers are being harmed or killed and WAPDA does nothing except side with the WB. They are supporting us, nor keeping the community safe... Another respondent (9) denoted that, ...They are just greedy and lazy. No other words fit their behaviour, as they come here and do very little...

In terms of Engineer - NK, this is typified by one respondent (3) who advised that, *...This company has no interest in OHS or its management. The WB knows that and pressures them [NK] to accept that the WB are in charge of the project. Some people here believe that the WB brought the problems to the project and use the project to make everyone do what they say... Another respondent (6) indicated that, ...NK are here only for themselves. They follow every order from the WB. We would be better off with our own Engineer (Pakistani), not these who show us no respect...*

4. Discussion

The seeds of toxicity were sown 10 years earlier, when the project started and has either not been recognised, and/or based on judgements of the present situation, the Project stakeholders are happily cooperating in the non-performance of the Project. This was reinforced through defensive and self-protective, egotistical behaviours which appears to have led to toxic leadership (Singh, Sengupta and Dev, 2018). This was taken further by the project-imposed Donor group, who were operating openly and undermining good project governance (Bekker, 2015) and effective leadership (Kouzes and Posner, 2002) through destructive leadership and petty tyranny (Krasikova, Green, and LeBreton, 2013). In many respects, the data clearly indicates that the toxic leadership has been self-reinforcing (Semedo, et al., 2022) and the present situation will not change because of the continuous pressures posited by the Donor group who are unjustifiably implementing changes that are incoherent, undemocratic through an aggressive, arrogant stance. The WB stance is also illogical as not one in the group has any credibility on the project, and a review of their CVs show that they have little or no OHS qualifications and also appear to want to manage the project by proxy (see later). This stance, by a WB Donor sub-group, is perceived inappropriate and does not follow the underlying published principles and governance requirements for a project donor (WB, 2023). This is especially so, with the engagement of non-credible “international” experts employed (who are Pakistani) and the avoidance of transparency of operations by the Donor group (Engaging Citizens, 2018).

4.1 Leadership

The levels of toxic leadership experienced by the project, suggests that project management are wholly involved and have legitimised the negative effects of toxic leadership on the project performance (Lipman-Blumen, 2006). The reports of conditioned abuse utilised as a norm, also created a threatening and hostile work environment (Chamberlain and Hodson, 2010) negatively affecting personal performance (Rasool, et al., 2021) that shows divisions and unrealistic outcomes that are considered unprofessional and autocratic (Pizzolitto, Verna and Venditti, 2022). This means that organisational and personal ethics is ignored (Ashforth, 1994). Further, power is utilised to support the toxic leader’s goal and objectives (Sankowski, 1995) - espoused through an operational clique (Furnham, 2010), rather than the legitimate project’s

requirements (APM, 2021). This has negatively affected decision-making, which is focused on short-term gains, that lack any overall fundamental project management capability (Killen and Hunt, 2013). Performance was reduced due to the inadequate capability and physical and verbal abuse (Karabati, 2021) by the Donor group, which is reported to have compromised the overall project leadership.

4.2 Donor Group Behaviour

The outcome suggests that the Donor group attitude was narcissistic, arrogant, defensive, blaming, authoritarian and collusive (Thoroughgood, et al., 2016). These aspects together illustrate how the Donor group has manipulated the internal stakeholders trust (Greenwood and Van Buren, 2010) through a consistent illegitimate use of power (Ninan, Mahalingam and Clegg, 2019). Further, the data indicated that the Donor group have acted as corporate bullies, underpinned by a blame culture (Woodrow and Guest, 2017) that reinforced their imposed power position on the project. The donor behaviour shows a consistent and pernicious lack of personal integrity (Blair, Hoffman and Helland, 2008). From the research data, it would appear that the Donor group are the only individuals creating such wholesale anxiety and operational distraction that has been a consistent issue for the project for over 3 years.

4.3 OHS Provision

The data supports the notion that there is inadequate OHS project provision that results from a weak safety culture (Lingard and Yesilyurt, 2003) orchestrated by the Donor group. Further, the demonstrated lack of application of appropriately focused OHS principles and practices by the Donor group staff, has negatively affected the Project OHS outcomes leading to a reduced safety climate (Luo, 2020) and increased severe incidents as the Donor group appears to want to make sure they can continue their toxic leadership behaviour on the project without restriction (Singh, Sengupta and Dev, 2018).

Of further concern, was that not one of the Donor group staff were OHS certified at any level and neither were the WB Mission staff members. This is a primary obstacle to the effective management of OHS provision on the project (Smith and Wadsworth, 2009), as the Donor OHS group had no idea how to manage the consistent unsafe conditions on the project. The Donor group instructions were defined when they made all OHS staff view their unprofessional temporary “show and tell” OHS training sessions (Mollo, Emuze and Smallwood, 2019). This was conducted as a way to make OHS staff accept their power-driven ideology (Sankowski, 1995) through the administration of OHS obfuscation through concealing project information (Tang, Ghorbani, and Chorus, 2021). This is done to assist in the proliferation of the inadequate OHS Management strategy by the internal stakeholders through unethical rule evasion (Amoah And Steyn, 2022), lack of compliance engagement (Mearns, Whitaker and Flin, 2003) and the need to adopt more Donor staffing to increase the costs and prevent more effective project measures to deal with identified OHS failures. This implicitly personifies the Donor group take-over of the project management by proxy and consistent unethical behaviour (Mason, 2008).

The lack of OHS knowledge, OHS management capability, trust and credibility, and the lack of managerial experience shown by the Donor group created major conflict on the project (Milosevic, Maric and Lončar, 2020). This was due primarily to their inadequate understanding of project OHS requirements and obligations under the contract. This created huge issues for consistent project progress and the complete lack of empowerment for community employed OHS inspectors/workers.

4.4 Internal Stakeholders

WAPDA has caused huge damage to the local communities. WAPDA management appear to act in collusion with the Donor group (Galvin, Tywoniak and Sutherland, 2021) where the effect of maladministration through the toxic culture (Appelbaum and Roy-Girard, 2007) has created severe costs (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2015) associated with project deaths, major injuries and loss of work for local inhabitants. The Employer appears to have allowed the Donor group to takeover the project management through “force” of misinformation (Lipman-Blumen, 2006) and whilst doing so, continue to ignore the serious non-performance of the OHS engagement of the Contractor and the abuse of finances associated with leverage for funding another project.

A host of internal stakeholder “mistakes” arising from improper management (Sutterfield, Friday-Stroud and Shivers-Blackwell, 2006) underpins the lack of record keeping and ignoring of non-compliances (ILO, 2019). However, this paper focuses on toxic leadership and not on any aspect of fraud developments on the project. However, this is also misrepresentation by the Engineer of the project management (Flyberg, 2009) and a source of project corruption behaviour (Locatelli, et al., 2017) designed to ensure that the Donor group can force the project to pay the US\$25 million demanded for the increase in substandard OHS governance by external Pakistani “foreigners” - those Pakistani personnel that live in Canada - despite the claims associated with additional financing developments and authorisations.

The data further suggests that the community has not been supported, nor managed effectively (Teo and Loosemore, 2017), and this reflects on the poor stakeholder governance of the project, underpinned by the toxic leadership focus of the Donor group. The WB Donor governance protection issues and capability has therefore been seriously compromised with no transparency or adequate oversight (WB, 2023). This was reported as being established through destructive leadership, overt aggression, punitive and discriminatory decision-making (Kelloway, et al., 2005). The negative influences of the deliberately wayward Donor group on the project management operations, is a direct result of the toxic leadership designed to control and subdue project personnel (Einarsen, Aasland and Skogstad, 2007).

4.5 Raised Issues

The data and the analysis heavily indicates that the toxic nature of the Donor group has had significant and negative effects on the project management and the OHS provision on the project. This has led to many instances of incidents (both on the project and on the project footprint). Contractors have, in collusion with the Donor group, “escaped” their contractual

responsibilities and paid out project monies of reported large unknown amounts to individuals who remain unknown, and unrelated to the project operations.

Subsequently, a variety of indications from the analysis of the data suggests a major project situation where:

1. A WB organisational “Munchausen syndrome by proxy” (Fraher, 2016) reflecting the WB Donor group need to manage the project and impose their unprofessional faulty view of the project operational and to establish a consistent basis for desperately raising issues to continue the Donor group, irrational and interfering project activities.
2. A Donor group that are unqualified and uninformed to conduct OHS activities on the project or mandate that anyone else must conduct such activities on the project.
3. A Client desperate to have funding for an independent project, will absorb a US\$25 million cost and leverage activities on the Dam project, by an unqualified and aggressive administrative WB Donor group.
4. A project management (including stakeholders) who together accept the Donor group pressures, despite being told in many, many reports of the inadequacy of the Donor group’s activities and the irresponsible and direct interference in the project management and operations.
5. An external stakeholder - the community strenuous indications - that the Donor group has created the situation focus, that led to the deaths of 14 persons and injured 34 more on the project.
6. The toxic leadership continues without abating, and is not recognised or understood by the project management and the internal stakeholders who are party to it.

4.6 Subsequent Dam Project Management Issues:

1. Underpinning toxic leadership was the invective that created and sustained the damaging working environment orchestrated by the Donor group against persons whose only thoughts were to ensure that staff and workers remained safe on the Project, despite the rhetoric.
2. Bullying and threatening behaviour - Management style - where errant traduce became the norm from the Donor group and the NK supervising management supporting them.
3. Autocratic tendencies and arrogance of the Pakistan nationals working for the WB
4. Pakistan nationals masquerading as “Internationals” - designed to perpetuate the internal requirement to hide money trails as well as hide the clear cases of inadequate OHS competence and professionalism.
5. WB providing quartering for nationals to extract monies from the Dam Project for altruistic notions, who were unqualified in OHS and lacked any experience on the main project technical aspects or even the dam industry or as a civil engineer.

6. When initially employed, no WB resident mission “staffing” in Pakistan had any professional qualifications or experience in OHS provision of any kind, for any industry.
7. Over a hundred reports eluding to the incapability of the Donor group and the toxic way they conducted themselves at site were ignored by the internal stakeholders and the WB over a lengthy period.
8. Lack of leadership as a pretence to hide the relevancy and adequacy of the Donor group’s activities relating to the Project, lack of documentation trails and the overall irrational leverage used to provide funding for another project - for the same employer.
9. The Donor group were continuously abusing their position of trust by getting rid of personnel - Pakistani’s and internationals - who have been dismissed unlawfully because they have disagreed with the Donor aggression and illegitimate orientation.

An urgent risk assessment is necessary to assess the level of bullying and bravado associated with both Pakistan nationals and dual Canada/Pakistan nationals who acted with impunity - about their behaviour. The government appears to accept any behaviour from the WB Donor group as necessary, in order to receive the US\$700Mn dollars for another project.

5. Conclusion

The toxic leadership of the Donor group has had a profound negative impact on the project through non-compliance pressures (Reason, 1997). This has led to project incapability to manage and sustain appropriate OHS provision. Further, there has been a failure to address appropriate project managerial requirements and the imposition by the Donor group of radical and dangerous OHS practices. These were believed by the respondents to underpin the negative outcomes that discriminated against personnel who tried to conduct their work as professionals on the project.

The level and intensity of the toxic leadership engagement reflects an organisational Munchausen syndrome by proxy (Fraher, 2016). This is an important outcome that personifies the true requirements of the toxic leadership implemented by the Donor group. The stunning negative effects on the project management appears to have led the project into addressing what the Donor group wants, rather than the professional requirements from experienced dam engineers. Of great concern is that the Donor group behaviour has affected the operational pursuits of the project, and that monies are being siphoned off to aspects of the project that is not substantiated through appropriate engineering management channels.

This outcome indicates the clear prejudicial behaviour of the Donor group that ignores transparency and integrity of the Donor governance requirements and engages with internal stakeholders to hold the community and project personnel “hostage” to the project management by proxy, that has taken place over the past 3 years.

The Donor gained the ability to leverage and negatively influence the dam project through a process that provided funding for an independent project - but only if the Donor could have a stake in the management of the dam project. This was after the material negative effects on the dam project through ineffective and unnatural management by proxy of the WB donor. The

proper internal governance of the Donor group is brought into question by the outcomes from this research.

As one respondent stated, “...it is time to get rid of WB from Pakistan, as they show how divisive their methods are on the project and in the country”. The outcome is therefore clear, if WB want to provide donor capacity building and capability, its toxic operating culture must change. This harmful and aggressive operational “norm” of the Donor group has had a significant and negative performance impact on a Dam Project in Pakistan and has also formed the basis for outright discrimination, abuse, narcissistic, arrogant, defensive, blaming, authoritarian and collusive. These Donor group traits are not what a third-world country project should experience when investing huge amounts of money from a Western bank.

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