Ownership Structure and Investment Efficiency: Evidence From Egypt

Ahmed Rashed, Ebitihj Abd El-Rahman, Esraa Ismail, Doaa Abd El-Samea

Abstract


This paper aims to examine the relationship between Ownership Structure Mechanisms (Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Block holder Ownership and Outside Director Ownership) and Investment Efficiency by using panel data analysis. To investigate this relationship used the multiple regression models. Findings of investigation of 35 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the period 2006 to 2015 by balanced Panel model representative. Results indicated that Managerial Ownership isn’t related with investment efficiency. In contract, institutional ownership, block holder ownership and outside director ownership have a negative relationship with investment efficiency. In addition, the researcher found that control variables (Firm size, Debt ratio, Tobin’s Q) not related to investment efficiency. These findings imply that the Majority of Egyptians firms relies on institutional without individual ownership and then reduces much of possible from agency problems and decreasing information asymmetry and facilitating the monitoring of investment decisions.


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v8i4.13630

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